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Enterprise Systems and Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Introduction 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have become increasingly popular in the last few 
decades. M&As are used by firms to acquire new resources and redeploy existing 
resources in new contexts. The value-generating potential of M&A explains the number 
and size of M&A (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). In 2014, 82,354 M&A were 
completed around the world with a total deal value of 4,708 billion U.S. Dollars (Bureau 
van Dijk 2014). Given the scale of M&A, our overall understanding of M&A actions is 
fragmented and a fundamental managerial logic that unifies these disparate streams is 
lacking. Therefore, my dissertation tries to unpack the value creation effects of M&A 
from the standpoint of efficiency enhancement and resource coordination.  
M&As allow firms to extend the deployment of their existing resources and 
capabilities to novel contexts, creating value by improving the performance of the 
acquired firm (Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 2012). Additionally, acquisitions are also a 
means for the acquirers to obtain new resources and capabilities, allowing them to bridge 
capability gaps (Capron and Mitchell, 2009) and enter new markets (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002). Whether an M&A is executed to derive value from deploying current 
resources to novel contexts or for new resource acquisition, the ability to appropriately 
integrate the processes of target and acquiring firms is the single most important factor is 
realizing synergy (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) and enhancing the performance of the 
combined firm (Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
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Increasingly, the ability of firms to integrate resources and processes depends 
largely on the coordination capabilities provided by enterprise systems such as ERP 
Systems, CRM systems and SCM systems. As information systems become increasingly 
central to the management and operational control of enterprises, it is thus not a surprise 
that recent studies highlight that realized outcomes in M&A initiatives hinge on the 
challenges of merging the complex information systems of target and the acquiring firms 
(Yoo, Lyytinen, Heo 2004; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007). Consistent with the resource-
based view of value creation in firms I suggest that enterprise systems installed at the 
acquiring and target firms are central facilitators of the integration processes in M&A 
initiatives.  
Therefore, given the significance of M&A transactions and the central role 
enterprise systems play in the integration process, my dissertation examines the impacts 
and mechanisms of enterprise systems on the value creation in M&As. There are two 
chapters in this dissertation. The first chapter looks specifically at the role that enterprise 
systems play in the likelihood of a firm getting involved in M&As. The second chapter 
examines the premiums and performance of M&A deals from a coordination capabilities 
perspective: premiums paid and value realized are likely to be related to the coordination 
capabilities linked to Enterprise Systems in acquiring and target firms.  
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Chapter I: Impact of Enterprise Systems on Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are used by firms to acquire new resources and 
redeploy existing resources in new contexts. The value-generating potential of M&A 
explains the number and size of M&A (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). In 2014, 
82,354 M&A were completed around the world with a total deal value of 4,708 billion 
U.S. Dollars (Bureau van Dijk 2014). Prior research suggests a variety of efficiency 
oriented arguments for M&A such as cost reduction or profit enhancement from using 
production capacity more effectively (Sheth and Larson 1990; Singh and Montgomery 
1987), sharing knowledge among operating units (Morck and Yeung 1998), and umbrella 
branding of products (Wernerfelt 1988).  In contrast to the above synergy (efficiency) 
based logic, prior work also presents alternative motivations for M&A from an anti-
competitive perspective. Horizontal M&A can have anti-competitive effects if they lead 
to collusion, while non-horizontal M&A can be anti-competitive if they result in 
foreclosure or collusion. A vertical takeover of a supplier (or customer) can deny access 
to critical inputs (or outlets/markets) to its nonintegrated rivals (i.e., the foreclosure 
motivation, Shenoy 2012) or act as a mechanism that facilitates the flow of information 
between the integrated firm and its nonintegrated rivals (i.e., the collusion motivation, 
Shenoy 2012). These arguments highlight M&A as a way for a firm to gain efficiency or 
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market power through exclusive access to key resources in its primary, upstream, and 
downstream industries.  
There is a large body of research in IS that takes an efficiency perspective and 
examines how information technology (IT) impacts firm boundaries by reducing internal 
and external coordination costs (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 1994; Clemons et al. 1993; 
Dewan and Min 1998; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Hitt 1999; Malone et al. 1987; 
Forman and Gron 2011).  The empirical findings of this literature suggest that IT may 
reduce internal as well as external coordination costs as IT is associated with more 
diversified and less vertically integrated firms (Dewan and Min 1998; Hitt 1999). There 
are also studies about the impact of IT on strategic alliances (Tafti et al. 2013; Liu and 
Ravichandran 2015). However, the study of how IT, and in particular enterprise systems 
such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), customer relationship management (CRM) 
and supply chain management (SCM) systems impact firm boundaries through M&A has 
been underexplored. At their core, enterprise systems enable monitoring and coordination 
of activities within and across organizations. Thus, the internal coordination capabilities 
provided by ERP, CRM, and SCM systems can reduce agency costs associated with 
operating a larger (i.e., the focal and the acquired) firm and thereby increase the 
motivation to engage in horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate M&A. However, the 
external coordination capabilities provided by CRM and SCM systems can reduce the 
transaction cost to monitor and coordinate activities with downstream partners and 
upstream suppliers and reduce the need for costly and risky vertical M&A. The 
relationship between ERP, CRM, and SCM systems and M&A may also be contingent on 
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the characteristics of the focal firm and its industry environment. The size of the focal 
firm, or the unpredictability of downstream demand, or the market power of suppliers, 
may encourage focal firms to use ownership-based coordination, and ERP, CRM, and 
SCM systems may be related with more M&A.  Thus, the goal of this paper is to examine 
the relationship between ERP, CRM, and SCM systems and horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate M&A. 
This study uses a panel dataset of 707 Fortune 1000 firms that executed 1,973 
M&A deals from 2009 to 2014 and makes key theoretical and empirical contributions. 
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to explicate how by reducing agency and 
transaction costs, enterprise systems such as ERP, CRM and SCM systems may influence 
the likelihood of horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate M&A. The empirical contribution 
of this study is the finding that ERP, CRM, and SCM systems are related with horizontal, 
vertical, and conglomerate M&A in distinctive ways. Since ERP systems can reduce 
internal coordination costs, ERP systems are related with horizontal and conglomerate 
acquisitions, and that this effect is stronger for larger firms; and since CRM and SCM 
systems can reduce the cost of coordination with downstream partners and upstream 
suppliers, CRM and SCM systems are associated with the reduced likelihood of vertical 
M&A. However, if the focal industry faces very unpredictable demand, or if the supplier 
industry is very concentrated, CRM and SCM systems are related with more vertical 
M&A as CRM and SCM systems can reduce the (internal) coordination cost associated 
with operating a larger firm, thus enabling the firm to engage in ownership-based 
coordination.  
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2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The optimal boundary of the firm is influenced by the tradeoff between internal and external 
coordination costs (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). If enterprise systems reduce internal and/or 
external coordination costs, enterprise systems may affect M&A. When a firm makes an 
acquisition there are two main types of internal coordination costs: (i) a one-time cost of 
integrating the acquisition, and (ii) a change in the recurring cost of operating a larger firm. The 
one-time integration of an acquisition involves rationalization of business processes of the acquirer 
and the target firm (Sarrazin and West 2011). In this regard, the adoption of enterprise systems to 
replace legacy systems and custom built applications has increased the level of standardization of 
applications and reduced the overall cost and complexity of post-merger integrations (Sarrazin and 
West 2011; Ernst & Young 2011). Thus, enterprise systems can impact the one-time cost of 
integrating an acquisition as the acquirer can replicate the enterprise system modules/processes in 
the acquired firm (Du 2015).1 
However, in addition to the one-time integration cost, another important cost of integrating 
acquisitions is the recurring cost of operating a larger (i.e., the focal and the acquired) firm. As we 
discuss below, this recurring cost of operating a larger firm is the internal coordination cost in 
agency theory (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Jensen and Meckling 1976). If enterprise systems 
reduce internal coordination costs by reducing the recurring cost of operating a larger firm, firm 
boundary may extend as enterprise systems may encourage firms to achieve economies of scale 
through M&A. However, if enterprise systems reduce the external coordination cost associated 
with coordinating with customers and suppliers, enterprise systems may decrease the likelihood 
of M&A activities since firms can realize the benefits of scale and integration without the 
commitment and risks associated with acquisitions (Capron and Pistre 2002). The principal 
                                                 
1 Chung et al. (2003) describe how CEMEX grew into a global organization by acquiring and integrating 
acquisitions by replicating standardized business processes. 
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theoretical argument of this paper is that the optimal boundary of the firm is drawn based on the 
tradeoff between the recurring cost of internal coordination, in the case an acquisition is made; and 
the recurring cost of external coordination, in case no acquisition is made and the focal firm 
coordinates with external partners.2 Thus, if enterprise systems reduce the recurring cost of 
operating a larger firm, we should see more M&A; and if enterprise systems reduce the recurring 
cost associated with coordinating activities with external partners, we should see fewer M&A. 
Using Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics we present a coordination cost based 
framework that is employed to study how ERP, CRM, and SCM systems may affect M&A by 
influencing the tradeoff between the recurring cost of internal coordination, if an acquisition is 
made; and the recurring cost of external coordination, if no acquisition is made. 
2.1 Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics and the Boundary of the Firm 
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
In Agency Theory, a firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts among self-interested individuals—
principal and agents (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Under these contracts, the agent has his or her objective—the maximization of 
the agent's individual utility. Due to the discrepancy between the objectives of agents and the 
principal, agency cost is incurred by the organization. Agency cost includes the cost of monitoring 
the agents, bonding cost caused by the agent documenting and reporting his/her activities, as well 
as the residual loss (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Jensen 1985). When decision rights are located 
at the bottom of the hierarchy, information needs to be moved up through the hierarchy to top 
management. This generates another type of cost due to the transfer of information—decision 
information costs, which includes the cost to relocate information as well as opportunity costs due 
                                                 
2 This is not to say that the one-time integration cost is less important. It is just that since prior work has 
emphasized the one-time integration cost (e.g., Tanriverdi and Uysal, 2011), we focus on the recurring cost 
of integration.  
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to poor or delayed information (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991).  The sum of agency costs and 
decision information costs is referred to as the internal coordination cost.  
2.1.2 Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction cost economics posits that there are costs in using a market as a coordination 
mechanism and that the firm is an alternative mechanism that facilitates economizing on market 
transaction costs (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). The firm's cost for producing or procuring a 
given component is the sum of the production cost and the transaction cost and the firm’s 
sourcing decision is chosen to minimize this total cost (Clemons et al. 1993; Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1975). Although market suppliers can provide a component at a lower cost due to 
economy of scale and specialization, using the market involves significant transaction costs: 
finding a reliable supplier, contracting, monitoring and enforcing the contract, and coordinating 
with the supplier for the duration of the contract (Clemons et al. 1993).  These transaction costs 
are also known as external coordination costs. 
Clemons and Row (1992) further break transaction costs into costs of coordination and costs 
of transaction risk. Costs of coordination include the cost of exchanging information and 
incorporating that information into decision processes, as well as the cost incurred by the firm due 
to delays in the communication channel. Transaction risk is the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior by another party to the relationship, leading to uncertainty surrounding the level and 
division of the benefits from the increased integration of decisions and operations (Clemons and 
Row 1992). Information asymmetries, differences in bargaining power, incomplete or 
unenforceable contracts, relationship-specific investments, low number of potential suppliers and 
loss of resource control are all factors that can lead to high transaction risk (Clemons et al. 1993). 
The first column of table 1 summarizes the coordination cost framework that is used to study how 
ERP, CRM and SCM systems are related with firm boundary and M&A activities of firms.   
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2.2 Enterprise Systems and M&A Activities  
Enterprise systems comprise a centralized database and a modular suite of software applications 
that enable firms to implement standardized processes across the enterprise. ERP systems are 
used to manage internal operations, CRM systems are used to organize activities with 
downstream partners including customers, and SCM systems are used to coordinate activities 
with upstream suppliers. This section describes ERP, CRM, and SCM systems and then uses the 
coordination cost framework discussed above to examine how ERP, CRM, and SCM systems 
may be associated with M&A activities.  
2.2.1 ERP Systems  
ERP is an enterprise system which manages enterprise data and provides integration across 
enterprise functions (Gefen and Ragowsky 2005; Stratman 2007). The implementation of ERP 
systems typically requires that the terminology being used by different departments be 
standardized so that a common, organization-wide database can be built (Barki and Pinsonneault 
2005). This centralized database captures the transactions processed by ERP modules and 
provides a real-time view of core business processes. ERP systems also standardize and support 
cross-functional business processes. These cross-functional business process modules enable 
communication across different departments and facilitate organizational integration. In this way 
ERP systems enable visibility and coordination wherever there is interdependence among 
business units (Stratman 2007; Ferdows 2006). 
2.2.1.1 ERP Systems and M&A Activities of the Firm 
One key impact of ERP systems is reducing internal coordination costs. First, ERP systems 
reduce agency costs. ERP systems support the central functions such as finance and accounting; 
operational processes such as order processing and fulfillment; and human resource management 
processes such as compensation, benefits administration, and performance management. These 
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back-office functions replace part of the human agent work and therefore decrease agency costs. 
Similarly, by standardizing processes that minimize individual discretion, ERP systems decreases 
agency costs. Furthermore, ERP systems employ a single database for the entire enterprise. The 
use of common field definitions across different parts of the organization eases the process of 
recording and reporting to management, thereby reducing monitoring and bonding costs (Gattiker 
and Goodhue 2000). 
Second, decision information costs are also mitigated by ERP systems because of real-
time view of core business processes. ERP systems enable business process integration as tightly-
coupled ERP modules facilitate coordination among subsystems. This results in direct access to 
real-time operating information. Thus, top management can access local information and make 
informed decisions. Therefore, by reducing agency and decision information costs, ERP systems 
can reduce internal coordination costs. When internal coordination costs are reduced, firms can 
achieve economies of scale by making acquisitions, as ERP systems can reduce the internal 
coordination cost associated with operating a larger firm.3 Thus ERP systems may encourage 
firms to make acquisitions, specifically horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. Column 2 of 
table 1 summarizes the impact of ERP systems on internal coordination cost.  
Moderating Effect of Firm Size. The ability to identify new opportunities and organize 
effectively to take advantage of these opportunities is an important source of competitive 
advantage (Hendricks et al. 2007). In this regard, larger firms are likely to have a greater 
number of pre-existing ties which provide useful information to evaluate the benefits and 
                                                 
3 Trinity Health, by migrating the hospitals they acquire into their ERP platform, is able to bring their 
knowledge of drug order sets and patient acuity to the operations of target firms (Tanriverdi and Du 
2011b). For instance, when a new regulation regarding clinical practice to ensure patient safety goes into 
effect, these changes are reflected in the centralized clinical guidelines systems so that all clinics in the 
hospital system change their medical practice to be compliant with regulation the same day. This illustrates 
the ability to achieve clinical compliance that is a significant driver of agency cost in the healthcare 
industry. In this way the ERP systems reduce the internal coordination cost of operating a larger hospital 
system, and thereby provide the incentive to engage in horizontal M&A.  
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risks in acquiring these potential targets (Trichterborn et al. 2015). Thus, larger firms 
have more opportunities to achieve economies of scale by acquiring and integrating target 
firms. However, larger firms also face greater diseconomies of scale because of their size, 
as internal coordination cost is higher at larger scale.  The benefits of ERP systems from 
reduction in agency and decision information costs would therefore be greater for larger 
firms than for smaller firms. Thus, larger firms with ERP systems are likely to derive a 
greater decrease in internal coordination cost compared to smaller firms with ERP 
systems, and ERP systems would provide greater incentives to larger firms to engage in 
M&A. Accordingly, we expect firm size to positively moderate the relationship between 
ERP systems and horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that, 
Hypothesis 1: Existence of ERP systems will be positively related with horizontal 
and conglomerate M&A; 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): Firm size will positively moderate the relationship between the 
existence of ERP systems and horizontal and conglomerate M&A.  
2.2.2 CRM Systems  
CRM systems provide a standardized method for collecting capturing and sharing customer 
interactions and offer a combination of transactional and analytical features to manage different 
customer-facing operations. Typically, CRM systems support three functions: sales and customer 
service, marketing, and partner relationship management (Oracle Siebel CRM4).  Sales 
applications aid activities from lead qualification to deal closure. These systems improve 
interaction with customers by giving everyone in the organization access to a single source of 
truth via a customer repository. The marketing component of CRM systems supports marketing 
                                                 
4 Retrieved from http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/siebel/overview/index.html 
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activities, helps to track campaign effectiveness, and measures return on marketing programs in 
order to optimize marketing mix and spend. The partner relationship management component of 
CRM systems enables firms to share information with partners and manage partner relationships. 
This includes recruiting partners, defining partner goals and strategies, matching and routing 
leads to partners, joint marketing activities with partners, and partner performance analysis and 
rewards.  
2.2.2.1. CRM Systems and M&A Activities of the Firm 
CRM systems can decrease both the internal and external coordination costs of the focal firm. 
CRM systems can reduce internal coordination cost due to lower agency and decision information 
costs. Agency costs are lowered by decreasing monitoring costs. CRM systems make it easier for 
management to gain information about the performance of sales and customer service employees. 
CRM systems enable sales managers to schedule, monitor, and track sales activities. Similarly, 
CRM systems enable firms to supervise and monitor customer service activities. CRM systems 
also reduce agency cost by enabling firms to evaluate the effectiveness of different marketing 
programs so that marketing dollars can be allocated more efficiently. For example, CRM systems 
help track campaign effectiveness, and measure return on marketing programs. This enables firms 
to optimize marketing mix and spend, and helps to make more well-informed decisions.  
CRM systems can also reduce decision information costs. CRM systems deliver critical 
information to everyone involved in the sales process, including field sales, sales management, 
and channel partners to ensure that all users have current and consistent information they need to 
make informed decisions. CRM systems also decrease the opportunity cost caused by poor 
information. The information provided by CRM systems along with real-time reporting and 
historical analytics enables management to make better decisions.  In this way, by reducing 
agency and decision information costs, CRM systems reduce the internal coordination costs 
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associated with coordinating downstream activities. If CRM systems reduce the cost of 
coordinating downstream activities, firms can achieve economies of scale by conducting 
downstream activities on a larger scale. When firms can coordinate downstream activities on a 
larger scale, they have the incentive to make downstream acquisitions.5  
Besides internal coordination costs, CRM systems can also reduce external coordination 
costs by decreasing cost of coordination with customers and transaction risk. The cost of 
coordination with customers is decreased through the adoption of CRM systems. The process of 
ordering and order-tracking is automated by CRM systems. CRM systems enable firms to create, 
validate, and manage quotes and orders. They support pricing, availability checking, and credit 
and payment verification to ensure that orders are complete, valid, and accurate, before they are 
delivered to the customer. CRM systems also provide a single source of truth that eases 
communication between sales employees and customers; thus fewer mistakes are made, and 
requests are delivered in a timely manner.  
Furthermore, CRM systems decrease transaction risk by reducing information 
asymmetry. First, sales employees are better informed with CRM systems to guide their decision 
making. CRM systems give sales employees the information they need to take action and conduct 
intelligent interactions with customers. Second, with CRM systems, channel partners’ 
information also becomes more transparent. The partner relationship management component 
provides evaluation on sales, service, and marketing activities conducted with partners in order to 
assess partner performance. Thus, partners’ performance becomes more transparent to the focal 
firm. Consequently, CRM systems reduce the cost of coordination and transaction risk with 
                                                 
5 EMC acquired Documentum and moved all of Documentum’s products onto EMC's CRM platform 
(Tanriverdi and Du 2011a). Having Documentum’s products incorporated in the EMC’s CRM system 
allowed the salesforce (that now included the salesforce of Documentum) to include Documentum products 
along with EMC's products in customer proposals. The CRM system thus reduced the agency and decision 
information cost associated with the salesforce of EMC and Documentum. The CRM system thus lowered 
EMC’s cost of operating a larger firm with a more diverse product portfolio, and a larger salesforce and 
customer base, thereby justifying the acquisition of Documentum. 
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external customers/partners.  In this way, CRM systems reduce the external coordination cost of 
coordinating with downstream partners and reduce the need to make risky downstream 
acquisitions. Column 3 of table 1 summarizes the impact of CRM systems on internal and 
external coordination costs.  
From the above discussion, we can see that CRM systems can influence the vertical 
boundary of the focal firm in both directions; if the impact of decreasing internal coordination 
cost is higher, CRM systems may be related with more vertical M&A as ownership-based 
governance is more efficient. However, if the impact of decreasing external coordination cost is 
stronger, CRM systems may be associated with a smaller vertical firm i.e., fewer vertical M&A 
activities as information-based governance is more efficient overall.  Given that acquisitions are 
risky (Capron and Pistre 2002), we hypothesize that CRM systems are associated with fewer 
vertical M&A activities. 
Moderating Effect of Industry Dynamism. Environmental uncertainty is recognized as an 
important influence on firm actions in the management and IS literatures (Keats and Hitt 1988). 
When the focal firm’s industry is dynamic, industry sales are uncertain and unpredictable. 
Strategies and tactics such as long-term contracts and vertical integration are used to create a 
more predictable environment (Dess and Beard 1984). Thus, focal firm industry dynamism may 
moderate the relationship between CRM systems and vertical M&A. First of all, dynamism 
increases external coordination cost by increasing: (a) cost of coordination with customers, and 
(b) transaction risk. A focal industry being highly dynamic implies possible frequent price 
fluctuations, regular turnover of customers, and the necessity for timely and more communication 
between the focal firm and its customers. All these scenarios lead to a higher cost of coordination 
with customers. The focal industry being more dynamic also implies a higher transaction risk. 
Under unpredictable and volatile demand, information asymmetry between the focal firm and its 
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customers is higher. Also, long-term contracts are harder to form as a result of the 
unpredictability of the future. The problem of incomplete or unenforceable contracts also 
deteriorates since it is difficult for the contract to unambiguously cover all contingencies in a 
dynamic environment. Thus, dynamism increases the external coordination cost of the focal firm 
by increasing costs of coordination and transaction risk. Dynamism also increases internal 
coordination cost by increasing agency cost. Agency Theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
suggests that it is more difficult for the principal to monitor and evaluate individuals’ decisions in 
uncertain environments. When demand is dynamic, it is harder for the sales managers to decide if 
the poor performance is due to volatility of demand or due to lack of salesperson’s efforts.  
Firms may strive to manage the dynamism-induced increase in internal and external 
coordination cost by using the internal coordination capabilities of CRM systems. That is, firms 
may reduce the cost of coordinating with downstream partners by acquiring and integrating them, 
rather than dealing with the higher uncertainty of coordinating with an external partner (Salinger 
1988; Hart et al. 1990; Ordover et al. 1990). In other words, though dynamism may increase 
internal coordination costs, it may increase internal coordination costs less than the increase in 
external coordination costs. That is, since CRM systems can reduce the internal coordination cost 
of coordinating downstream activities, the focal firm may deal with industry dynamism by 
acquiring and integrating downstream partners; and industry dynamism may weaken any negative 
relationship between CRM systems and vertical M&A. Therefore, we propose:  
Hypothesis 2: Existence of CRM systems will be negatively related with vertical 
M&A; 
Hypothesis 2(a): If CRM systems are negatively related with vertical M&A, focal 
firm industry dynamism will weaken this relationship. 
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2.2.3 SCM Systems 
SCM systems support collection and sharing of information involved in the procurement of 
inputs; managing supplier interactions; and handling the logistics of storage and movements of 
raw materials, intermediate and finished goods. SCM systems typically support processes 
including demand planning and forecasting, supplier management, supply chain logistics, and 
inventory and returns management.  
2.2.3.1 SCM Systems and M&A Activities of the Firm 
SCM systems can reduce internal coordination costs in the supply chain (Lee et al. 1997). SCM 
systems allow firms to share demand, production planning, and inventory information in real time 
so that the focal firm can monitor raw materials procurement, production, and delivery of inputs 
(output) to its facilities (customers). Similarly, the movement of entities through a supply chain is 
expected to follow a planned sequence of steps. In this regard, SCM systems provide 
individualized trace data as entities move through the supply chain (Shu and Barton 2012). Thus, 
the increased visibility to events and entities in the supply chain reduces agency cost for the focal 
firm. SCM systems also reduce decision information costs in the supply chain. When a supply 
chain event doesn't occur on schedule the disruption can affect the supply chain process in many 
ways. By sharing scheduled and actual demand, production, and delivery information in real time, 
SCM systems enable firms to adapt to disruptions. For example, by monitoring process timeliness 
and sequence correctness, SCM systems help managers decide if and when to intervene (Shu and 
Barton 2012). Thus, by reducing agency and decision information costs, SCM systems reduce the 
internal coordination cost associated with an integrated supply chain. If SCM systems reduce the 
cost of operating an integrated supply chain, firms can achieve economies of scale by engaging in 
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vertical acquisitions. Thus, by reducing the internal coordination cost of operating a vertically 
integrated supply chain, SCM systems provide the incentive for vertical acquisitions.6  
SCM systems also provide firms the ability to streamline information exchange with their 
suppliers and reduce external coordination costs (Vollman et al. 2005). SCM systems enable 
firms to transact electronically with suppliers and reduce the costs of coordination through lower 
cost of exchanging information, fewer delays, and less miscommunication. For instance, using 
SCM systems, retailers can provide real time point of sale data (POS) to suppliers so that 
suppliers can schedule production and plan inventory replenishment that reduces warehousing 
and inventory costs in the supply chain. Such inter-organizational coordination allows firms to 
integrate their business processes with their suppliers’ business processes and achieve quasi-
integration (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).   
SCM systems also lower transaction risks by enabling firms to define and track 
commitments and ensure compliance. SCM systems can reduce transaction risks by continuously 
monitoring compliance with order terms such as on-time deliveries and product performance 
against contractual commitments, and by notifying interested parties when a compliance issue 
arises. Also, as SCM systems can monitor real-time business process events, they can sense 
exception conditions and respond with alerts and notifications to appropriate users and partners. 
For instance, firms in high technology industries can monitor deliveries by their authorized 
distributors to ensure regulatory compliance with export controls for their products.  Column 4 of 
table 1 summarizes the impact of SCM systems on internal and external coordination costs.  
In sum, SCM systems are important influences on vertical M&A due to their impact on 
internal and external coordination costs. On one hand, the internal coordination capabilities 
                                                 
6 Office Depot bought OfficeMax. Office Depot’s ability to derive value from this acquisition will depend 
on the Office Depot’s SCM system’s ability to rationalize and integrate OfficeMax’s distribution centers in 
the Office Depot supply chain. (Brown, Abram. (2013, February 19). “Office Depot-OfficeMax Merger 
Would Probably Avoid Antitrust Issues”. Retrieved from Forbes.com.) 
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provided by SCM systems can reduce agency and decision information costs associated with 
operating a larger and more vertically integrated supply chain. This ability to coordinate a larger 
and more integrated supply chain motivates firms to achieve economies of scale through vertical 
acquisitions. However, while the efficiencies of internal coordination from SCM systems can 
increase the motivations to engage in vertical M&A, M&A are risky (Capron and Pistre 2002). 
Since SCM systems can also reduce external coordination cost of coordinating with suppliers, 
they offer a means to realize the potential benefits of scale and integration without the cost and 
risk associated with vertical M&A. Therefore, by lowering costs of external coordination, SCM 
systems may lead firms to coordinate their supply chain activities through information-based 
governance rather than through vertical M&A and asset ownership. 
Moderating Effect of Supplier Industry Concentration. Supplier concentration may 
moderate the relationship between SCM systems and vertical M&A by increasing 
external coordination costs. As an important source of external coordination cost, 
transaction risk increases with the lack of bargaining power (Clemons et al. 1993). When 
the number of potential suppliers for a product is low, the supplier may attempt to exploit 
the focal firm’s dependence on it (Clemons et al. 1993). For example, the supplier may 
try to charge higher price which leads to a higher renegotiating cost. Also, the focal firm 
might have to invest in relationship-specific investments due to the lack of alternative 
sources of supply, which further deteriorates the holdup problem. In this regard, since 
SCM systems can reduce internal coordination costs associated with operating a larger 
and more vertically integrated supply chain, as supplier concentration increases, the focal 
firm may acquire suppliers to engender a more predictable environment. In other words, 
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as supplier concentration increases, SCM systems are likely to be associated with an 
increase in vertical M&A. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses, 
Hypothesis 3: Existence of SCM systems will be negatively related with vertical 
M&A;  
Hypothesis 3(a): If SCM systems are negatively related with vertical M&A, 
supplier industry concentration will weaken this relationship. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data and Sample 
We study how a focal firm’s (i.e., potential acquirer’s) ERP, CRM and SCM systems affect the 
number of M&A the firm makes. Our sample comprises North American Fortune 1000 firms 
from 2009 to 2014. The unit of analysis is a firm-year i.e., the type and number of M&A a focal 
firm makes in a given year. This study has four major data sources. First, explanatory variables 
including ERP, CRM and SCM system implementation information are obtained from the Harte-
Hanks CI database. Second, the M&A data is collected from the SDC Platinum Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. Third, the industry relatedness data and industry level control variables 
including industry concentration are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Census Bureau of United States. Finally, focal firm industry dynamism and firm level control 
variables are calculated from the COMPUSTAT database.  
From the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database, we obtain all the mergers and 
acquisitions completed between 2009 and 2014 with the acquirer being in North America7.  The 
SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions data and the ERP, CRM, and SCM system information 
from Harte-Hanks are merged based on the exchange and ticker information from Harte-Hanks 
                                                 
7 We removed all the deals that were listed as: (a) repurchases, self-tender offer, recapitalization, buyback, 
exchange offer, spinoff, or divestiture (this is consistent with Shenoy 2012) and (b) deals that have either 
the acquirer or target being in the public sector (2-digit North American Industry Classification system 
being 92). We removed all the deals involving the public sector because in the BEA input-output table the 
mapping between IO and the NAICS public sector is not available.  
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and the SDC database. M&A transactions are categorized into horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate M&A deals based on the Vertical Relatedness Index (VRI) (Fan and Goyal 2006) 
and the industries that the acquirer and target are in. VRI, as defined immediately below, is 
calculated from BEA Use Tables 2007 (before redefinition/producer value) with 388 industries. 
Finally, the data is aggregated to the firm-year level with the dependent variables being the 
number of horizontal, pure vertical, and conglomerate M&A that the focal firm made each year. 
This process results in a final sample of 707 unique firms across six years from 2009-2014 
totaling 3,208 firm-year observations. These firms come from 180 Input-Output (IO) industries8. 
From year 2009 to 2014, they made 1,973 M&A deals in total. 
3.2 Variables and Measurements  
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study include the number of horizontal, pure vertical, and 
conglomerate M&A in each firm-year. The assessment of whether an M&A deal is a horizontal, 
pure vertical, or conglomerate M&A is based on the primary industries that the acquirer and 
target firms are in, as well as the amount of input/output flow between these two industries. Using 
the Input-Output Use table from BEA we construct a continuous Vertical Relatedness Index 
(VRI) for every industry pair. For each industry pair i and j, the VRI is defined as the maximum 
of the dollar value of input from industry i (j) in order to produce one dollar of industry j (i)’s 
output. Based on the VRI and the industries that acquirer and target firms are in, the dependent 
variables are defined as follows (Fan and Goyal 2006):  
Table 2: Definitions of the Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variables Definitions 
                                                 
8 We use the BEA defined input-output industries as our definition of industries.  There were 389 industries 
in total in 2007.  
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Horizontal M&A 
A horizontal M&A is defined as a merger or acquisition between firms 
belonging to the same IO industry. 
Pure vertical M&A 
A pure vertical M&A refers to a merger or acquisition between firms 
belonging to different IO industries, and having VRI higher than 1%9.  
Conglomerate M&A 
A conglomerate M&A is a merger or acquisition between firms in different 
IO industries that have low vertical relatedness (VRI lower than 1%).  
 
The choice of these three dependent variables has many advantages. First, horizontal, pure 
vertical, and conglomerate M&A add up to the total number of M&A, so there is no double 
counting of M&A. Also, since ERP systems influence internal coordination costs, they may affect 
horizontal and conglomerate M&A; and since CRM and SCM systems influence internal and 
external coordination costs in vertical coordination, they may affect pure vertical M&A. In this 
way the analysis provides a comprehensive picture about the impact of enterprise systems on 
(horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate) M&A. 10 
3.2.2 Independent Variables  
The key independent variables are ERP, CRM, and SCM systems in the firm. The information 
about these systems exists at the site level. We aggregated the site level availability of the 
systems to the firm level by weighting by the number of employees at the site.  
ERP System. The ERP system variable was constructed using Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) on three modules: accounting/finance (ACC), human resources (HR) and workflow 
(WORKFLOW) software. Harte-Hanks database provides information on ACC, HR and 
WORKFLOW module implementation in each site (1 if implemented, 0 otherwise). ACC, HR 
and WORKFLOW module implementation at the site was weighted using the number of 
                                                 
9 In the analysis, we also present results with 0% and 5% cutoffs.  
10 Vertical M&A are M&A where VRI is higher than 1% and the acquirer and the target are not necessarily 
from different IO industries. The results for vertical M&A are quite similar to the results for pure vertical 
M&A. 
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employees to generate firm-level module implementation. Then we conducted PCA on the firm-
level ACC, HR WORKFLOW module implementations. From the result of the PCA, we take the 
first principal component (it has an eigenvalue of 2.3 and is the only component with an 
eigenvalue higher than 1) as our measure of ERP system.  
CRM and SCM System. Harte-Hanks collected information on CRM and SCM system module 
implementation at the site level (1 if implemented, 0 otherwise). We aggregated the site-level 
CRM and SCM system information to the firm level by weighting them using the number of 
employees at the site.  
The second key independent variable is the size of the focal firm. This is measured as 
the standardized total number of employees in the firm (standardized to mean 0 and 
standard deviation of 1). The third independent variable is dynamism of the focal firm 
industry. Dynamism refers to the volatility and unpredictability of the changes that a 
business unit has to deal with (Keats and Hitt 1988). Following Keats and Hitt (1988), 
dynamism is measured as the volatility of industry sales. Sales volatility is measured 
using a two-step procedure. First, the natural logarithm of the total sales of IO industries 
is regressed against an index variable of years, over a period of five years. Second, the 
antilog of the standard error of the regression coefficient is used as the measure for sales 
volatility. The intuition behind this measure is that the standard error of the regression 
coefficient reflects the unpredictability of the sales growth rate. The fourth key 
independent variable is supplier industry concentration. Supplier industries are 
recognized by BEA Use Tables 2007—any industry that has goods inflow into the focal 
firm industry. Since one focal firm can have multiple supplier industries, supplier 
industry concentration is a weighted average of the industry concentrations measured by 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of all the supplier industries as recognized above. For 
each IO industry, HHI is not directly available from US Census. We calculated IO 
industry HHI by following these two steps: (1) use the sales (or receipt, revenue) for the 
largest 4, 8, 20, 50 and all firms for each industry defined at the 6-digit NAICS level to 
construct the HHI for each NAICS industry; (2) calculate HHI of IO industries as a 
weighted average of NAICS HHI (the weight being the square of sales share of each 
NAICS industry in the IO industry).  
3.2.3 Control Variables  
Existing research on M&A identifies a number of variables that influence M&A. At the firm 
level, we control for the level of vertical integration and diversification. A more vertically 
integrated firm may have greater propensity to engage in vertical M&A. We also control for the 
level of related and unrelated diversification (Fan and Lang 2000). Firms with high level of 
related diversification may engage in more horizontal M&A and firms with high level of 
unrelated diversification may engage in more conglomerate M&A.  
We also control for the size and financial condition of the focal firm. Multiple studies report 
the effect of the size of acquirer, where large firms are known to make more acquisitions. Thus, 
we use standardized total number of employees to control for the size of the focal firm (Hannan 
and Freeman 1984). Acquirer performance is also an important factor in M&A as more successful 
firms may engage in more M&A. Acquirer firm performance is measured as net income divided 
by total asset of the acquirer from the previous year. Organizational slack has also been linked to 
M&A (Lang et al. 1991) as firms with more slack may engage in more M&A. Acquirer slack is 
calculated as the focal firm’s cash in hand in the previous year, divided by total asset (Lang et al. 
1991). We also control for other information technology at the firm, including number of PCs and 
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servers per employee and the proportion of IT employees in total employees. These variables 
measure the level of IT investment and IT capabilities in the focal firm.  
At the industry level, we control for the concentration and munificence of the focal industry. 
Industry concentration controls for the level of competition in the industry that may influence 
M&A. Industry concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from 
2007 Economic Census. Munificence refers to the opportunities for growth in an industry that 
may also influence M&A (Dess and Beard 1984). Following Keats and Hitt (1988), we use the 
growth in industry sales as a measure of munificence. Industry conditions such as the total 
volume of M&A activities in the industry are also known to affect acquirers’ behavior (Bergh and 
Lawless 1998). Thus we control for total number of M&A in the acquirer industry in the current 
year (aggregated from SDC data).  
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
The baseline specification is a negative binomial regression. In order to mitigate potential 
endogeneity, we also employ instrumental variables to address the possibility of selection and 
omitted variable bias. Finally, to better support a causal relationship between enterprise 
information systems and M&A, we also explore the within-firm variation in the data. We conduct 
a Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) procedure (Iacus et al. 2011a; Iacus et al. 2011b; Ho et al. 
2007) to identify our treated and control samples (firms that implemented one of the three 
enterprise information systems are recognized as the treated group; those who did not implement 
any system are considered the control group). Using this matched sample, we employed a 
difference-in-difference (DD) analysis to explore how the implementation of a system changes a 
firm’s decision on M&A.  
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3.3.1 Baseline Model: Negative Binomial Regression 
Our baseline empirical strategy employs a pooled negative binomial regression with the M&A 
counts per firm-year as the dependent variables. As an extension of the Poisson regression, a 
negative binomial regression is used to estimate models of counts of an event when the event has 
extra-Poisson variation in the form of over-dispersion. A formal test of the null hypothesis of 
equi-dispersion rejects the null hypothesis of equi-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). 
Therefore, a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson regression. We estimate 
the negative binomial model with robust standard errors, clustered by firm with year fixed effects. 
3.3.2 Instrumental Variables 
In order for the estimation in the baseline model to be consistent, we are functioning under the 
assumption that there is no unobservable in our baseline model that is correlated with both the 
M&A activities and ERP, CRM and SCM system implementation of the firm. There are scenarios 
under which this assumption may be violated. For example, a manager who seeks more power 
may decide to expand the firm and at the same time install an ERP system to get better access to 
local information. In order to address omitted variable bias and potential simultaneity, we 
estimate Poisson regression with instrumental variables.  
The first set of instrument variables include the total IT employment (IT-
EMPLOYMENT) and weighed average annual IT salary (IT-SALARY) in each Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) from the previous year (standardized to mean = 0 and standard deviation 
= 1). This data is collected from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. It contains the total 
employment and mean annual wage of computer related occupations in each of the 385-399 
MSAs. We weighted the mean annual wage of each IT occupation in each MSA by the IT 
employment to calculate IT-SALARY for each MSA year.  
  26 
The second set of instrument variables include ERP, CRM and SCM system 
implementation in the focal MSA and industry (MSA-IND-ERP, MSA-IND-CRM and MSA-
IND-SCM). MSA-IND-ERP is calculated as follows: (1) Harte-Hanks database provides detailed 
information on 500,000 sites in the US for each year. (2) Each site-year is categorized into a 
specific MSA (using the zip code of the Harte-Hanks site)-industry (using 2-digit SIC code). (3) 
The variable MSA-IND-ERP is calculated as the weighted ERP system score of all the sites 
within that MSA and industry (the weight used here is the number of employees at the site in that 
year). MSA-IND-CRM and MSA-IND-SCM are constructed the same way.  
Valid instrumental variables need to satisfy two conditions: (1) they have to directly 
influence ERP, CRM and SCM systems, and (2) they have to be exogenous, i.e., that they cannot 
affect M&A other than through the ERP, CRM, and SCM system variables. First of all, both sets 
of our instruments directly affect the explanatory variables. MSA IT employment and salary 
reflect the availability of local IT labor/skill that is relevant to ERP, CRM and SCM system 
implementation and the cost of using such labor pool. Therefore, these two IVs affect focal firm 
ERP, CRM, and SCM system implementation through IT labor demand and supply. MSA-IND-
ERP, MSA-IND-CRM, MSA-IND-SCM influence the implementation of focal firm’s ERP, 
CRM, SCM system through local peer influence. A focal firm that is in a MSA-industry where 
ERP, CRM, SCM system implementation is common is more likely to implement ERP, CRM, 
SCM system as well. For example, if peers have implemented an enterprise system, it would 
lower a firm’s cost of implementing the enterprise system because of the ability to learn from 
prior implementation by peers. We also conducted formal tests of weak IV. The first stage result 
shows (see more details in table 6) that these IVs are significantly correlated with the endogenous 
variables.  
Second, these two sets of IVs also meet the exclusion restriction condition. For the first set of 
IVs IT-EMPLOYMENT and IT-SALARY, we take their one-year lag to remove the possible 
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scenario that the focal firm inflates the local IT employment and salary due to a large scale M&A. 
It is quite unlikely for the MSA IT employment and salary from the previous year to directly 
influence the focal firm’s decision on a M&A deal. We argue that given the strategic significance 
of M&A, it is improbable for a focal firm to forego an otherwise attractive deal simply due to low 
availability or high cost of IT skills locally, since there are other options to fill the IT skill gap, 
for example through outsourcing.  Similarly, it is also quite improbable for a focal firm to conduct 
a M&A deal solely because it sees an opportunity to take advantage of an over-supply or low cost 
of local IT labor. In addition, we also argue that the second set of IVs only affects M&A through 
the implementation of these systems at the focal firm. If MSA-IND-ERP, MSA-IND-CRM, 
MSA-IND-SCM directly influences the focal firm’s decision on a M&A deal, they are most 
likely to do so through affecting a firm’s performance, cash in hand, or product market 
competition. First, in our IV models, all these three variables are controlled for. Second, it is 
unlikely for these IVs to affect the focal firm’s M&A through better performance of competitors 
due to the implementation of ERP, CRM and SCM system in these firms (i.e., focal firm’s 
performance or cash in hand worsens compared to competitors due to the implementation of ERP, 
CRM and SCM system in the competitors). This is because MSA-IND-ERP, MSA-IND-CRM, 
MSA-IND-SCM are weighted averages of multiple sites in the focal firm from different MSAs 
and industries; they do not measure the availability of these systems in one single MSA or 
industry. Therefore, these IVs capture the local peer influence of the systems without impacting 
either the focal firm or its competitors’ performance.  
3.3.3 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and Difference-in-Difference (DD) Analysis 
In order to further examine the evidence we find in the negative binomial regressions and the 
models with IVs, we run three sets of DD analysis (one for each of the systems) to explore within 
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firm variation in how the implementation of ERP, CRM and SCM systems affects the likelihood 
of horizontal, pure vertical and conglomerate M&A at that firm.  
CEM is a non-parametric data preprocessing (matching/pruning) method that belongs to 
the “monotonic imbalance bounding” (MIB) class. Compared to the other major class of 
matching method “equal percent bias reducing” (EPBR), of which propensity score matching 
(PSM) is an example, MIB method has many desirable statistical properties. First of all, MIB 
eliminates many of the assumptions required for unbiased estimates of treatment effects in EPBR, 
and outperforms EPBR in most situations, including those specifically designed to meet the 
EPBR assumptions (Iacus et al. 2011b). Second, matching methods aim to reduce imbalance in 
the data in order to reduce model dependence in the estimation of treatment effects and therefore 
improve causal inference. MIB reduces imbalance on all the moments of the data, while EPBR 
only reduces the mean imbalance. Furthermore, with CEM researchers can control and set up the 
imbalance reduction for each of the variables independently. Third, whereas methods such as 
PSM require determining ex ante the size of the matched control sample, then ensuring balance 
ex post, CEM does not fix the size of the control units’ ex ante but chooses the imbalance level ex 
ante (Iacus et al. 2011a). Thus, with the CEM method researchers have a better control over the 
imbalance level of the sample.  
We use the ERP system as an example to illustrate how the sample for the ERP DD 
analysis is constructed. First, we define the treated group as any firm that implemented ERP 
system but did not implement CRM or SCM system between 2006 and 2014. The control group is 
defined as any firm that did not implement ERP, CRM and SCM system in the same time frame. 
Second, we exactly matched the control firms to the treated firms based on industry code and the 
size of the firm in 2006, specifically, 2-digit SIC code and categories of total number of 
employees (there are four categories in total: 1-under 500 employees; 2-over 500 and under 1000 
employees; 3-over 1000 and under 10,000 employees; 4-over 10,000 employees). This CEM 
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procedure matched 12 treated to 10 control firms across 9 years from 2006 to 2014 resulting in a 
total of 158 observations. With an identical process, we constructed the CRM and SCM system 
CEM samples. The CRM system sample consists of 31 treated firms matched to 22 control firms 
with a total of 358 observations. The SCM sample is composed of 9 treated and 13 control firms 
with a total of 161 observations. In each of these samples, the treated and control firms in a 
matched pair are from the same industry (2-digit SIC) and employment size category. 
With the above samples, we run three DD analysis. The DD approach exploits the fact 
that we observe the number of M&A done by the treated and control firms both before and after 
the implementation of the specific system. The before-implementation difference in M&A 
between the treated and control firms serves as a benchmark against which to examine the after-
implementation difference. The DD analysis aims to use the within-firm variation before and after 
the implementation to identify the impact of the ERP, CRM, and SCM system implementation. 
We also included the moderating effects of the number of employees, dynamism, and supplier 
industry concentration. The basic model takes the following form:  
 
Here, the unit of analysis is a firm-year.  indicates the firm while  represents the year from 2006 
to 2014. TREATED is the indicator of the firm being in the treated or control group (1 for the 
treated firms as defined above, 0 otherwise). For treated firms, AFTER is defined as 1 if the 
observation is from a year after the implementation of the system (the year that the 
implementation took place is removed). For every control firm, the year of the implementation is 
recognized to be the same as that of the matched treated firm. The MODERATOR refers to each 
of the moderators in the baseline model: the number of employees, industry dynamism, and 
supplier industry concentration.  is the same list of control variables that we used in the 
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baseline model. We estimated linear panel model with firm fixed effects and matched pair fixed 
effects, as well as pooled Poisson models.   
Take ERP DD analysis as an example,  and  capture the overall difference in M&A 
between the treated and control firms before the implementation of ERP.  and  capture 
the change after the implementation for the control firms. What we are really interested in here is 
the estimation of  and . They both reflect the change in the number of M&A for the 
treated firms after the implementation of the system, adjusted by the time trend of M&A in the 
control group.  reflects such counterfactual change for smaller firms while  is the net 
change of M&A for larger firms.  
4 RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss findings from the baseline negative binomial regression model and 
Poisson model with IVs and the DD analysis using the three matched samples for ERP, CRM and 
SCM system implementations respectively.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in table 3, on average each firm made approximately 0.19 horizontal, 0.11 pure vertical 
(if 1% cutoff of VRI is used), and 0.2 conglomerate M&A every year. The correlations between 
ERP, CRM and SCM systems and M&A suggest that these systems are positively related with the 
dependent variables.  
4.2 Baseline Model: Negative Binomial Regression 
Table 4 reports the baseline results. Models 1-7 show the impact of the independent and control 
variables on different dependent variables. The impact of the control variables is consistent with 
prior studies. Focal industry M&A is positively related with M&A of the focal firm. Also, better 
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performing firms tend to engage in more M&A. As expected, more vertically integrated firms 
tend to expand their vertical boundary further. Also, unrelated diversification is positively related 
with conglomerate M&A, but negatively correlated with horizontal M&A. These findings 
increase our confidence in the empirical models. 
We discuss the results with the 1% cutoff. However, we also include the results with 0% 
as well 5% cutoff. The cutoff % used does not affect the number of horizontal M&A. It only 
affects the number of pure vertical and conglomerate M&A. When a higher cutoff is used, there 
are fewer pure vertical and more conglomerate M&A compared to when a lower cutoff is used. 
Due to the fact that it is difficult to discuss the sign and size of the marginal effects (ME) in a 
negative binomial model with interactions, in table 5 we report the ME of the ERP, CRM and 
SCM system variables at three levels of the moderators (1 standard deviation (SD) below, at 
mean, and at 1 SD above the mean of each of the three moderators). We also plot these ME in 
figure 1. The ME in table 5 and the plots in figure 1 are based on a 1% cutoff.  
In table 4, the ERP system and its interaction with the standardized number of employees 
has no impact on horizontal M&A. However, the ERP system and its interaction with the 
standardized number of employees show that ERP system has a positive impact on the 
conglomerate M&A; when a 1% cutoff is used, this positive impact is significant (at 0.1 level) for 
smaller firms (model 5); under 5% cutoff this positive impact is significant (at 0.05 level) for 
smaller firms (model 7); when a 0% cutoff is used, the positive impact of ERP system is 
significant (at 0.05 level) for larger firms (model 3). In table 5, the ME indicates that when all the 
other variables are at their mean level, if the ERP system increases by 1 SD, which is 1.57, 
conglomerate M&A increases by 0.04 (model 3 of table 5: 0.024*1.57 = 0.04), which is 
approximately a 20% increase in the mean number of conglomerate M&A (0.04/0.2 = 20%). 
Although the ME is still positive when the firm is small (standardized number of employees at 1 
SD below the mean, model 3), the positive impact of ERP system is much smaller (conglomerate 
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M&A increase by 0.004*1.57 = 0.006 when ERP system increases by 1 SD). Similarly, the 
positive impact of ERP system is almost 3 times larger when the standardized number of 
employees is at 1 SD above the mean than at the mean. This moderating effect can be seen clearly 
in figure 1. Panel 2 indicates that ERP systems in vast majority of the cases has a positive impact 
on the number of conglomerate M&A and this positive impact increases with the size of the focal 
firm. This analysis supports hypothesis 1 and 1a.  
In table 4, CRM system and its interaction with dynamism have a significant impact (at 
0.01 level) on the number of pure vertical M&A across different cutoffs of pure vertical M&A 
(model 2, 4, and 6 of table 4). Model 2, 4 and 6 show that the direction and size of the impact of 
CRM system on pure vertical M&A depends on the dynamism level of the focal industry. When 
dynamism is low at 1 SD below the mean, if CRM system increases by 1 SD (0.22), pure vertical 
M&A decreases by 0.023 (-0.104*0.22, model 5 in table 5). This is approximately a 21% 
decrease (0.023/0.107) in the number of pure vertical M&A. However, if dynamism is at the 
mean, the number of pure vertical M&A increases by 0.009 (0.042*0.22) with 1 SD increase in 
CRM system, which translates to an 8% increase in the number pure vertical M&A. This positive 
effect becomes even higher when dynamism is high at 1 SD above the mean (0.236*0.22=0.052); 
this equals to an increase of over 48% compared to the mean level of pure vertical M&A in our 
sample (0.052/0.107). This moderating effect of dynamism on CRM can be seen in panel 3 of 
figure 1. This is analysis supports hypothesis 2 and 2a.  
In table 4, SCM systems have a negative impact on pure vertical M&A (model 2, 4, and 6 
of table 4). When the supplier industry concentration is relatively low, if 0% or 5% cutoff is used, 
the negative impact of SCM system is significant at 0.01 level; under 1% cutoff, SCM system is 
negative and significant at 0.05 level. This negative relationship amplifies (weakens) when the 
focal firm is facing supplier industries with lower (higher) level of concentration. This 
moderating effect is significant at 0.05 level (0% and 5% cutoff, model 2 and 6) and 0.1 level 
  33 
(1% cutoff, model 4). When SCM system increases by 1 SD (0.23), the number of pure vertical 
M&A decreases by 0.03, 0.02 and 0.009 (-0.129*0.23, -0.091*0.23, and -0.037*0.23, model 8 
table 5) when supplier industry concentration is at 1 SD below, at mean, and 1 SD above the 
mean. These numbers translate to a 27%, 18% and 8% decrease in the number of pure vertical 
M&A. Panel 4 of figure 1 presents the same result graphically. This analysis supports hypothesis 
3 and 3a.  
4.3 Poisson Regression with Instrumental Variables 
In order to address the potential omitted variable bias and simultaneity problem, we estimated 
Poisson models with instrumental variables. Besides the 5 IVs that we described above (IT-
EMPLOYMENT, IT-SALARY, MSA-IND-ERP, MSA-IND-CRM, and MSA-IND-SCM), we 
also interact the 5 IVs with the 3 moderators as the IVs for the interaction terms. For the 
estimation of the Poisson regression with instrumental variables, we used a control function (CF) 
approach. The CF estimator involves two steps. In the first step, a reduced form for the 
endogenous explanatory variables is estimated. In the second step, the estimated residual from the 
first step as well as the endogenous explanatory variables and other exogenous controls are 
included in a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (Wooldridge 2010).  
Table 6 shows the first-stage OLS results for our Poisson model with IVs. Model 1-3 has 
focal firm’s ERP, CRM and SCM system as the dependent variables respectively11. The signs of 
the IVs are as expected. MSA-IND-ERP is positively related with the implementation of all the 
enterprise systems. In general, MSA-IND-SCM is negatively related with ERP and CRM systems 
at the focal firm but positively related with the SCM system implementation. MSA IT 
employment is generally negatively related with the focal firm’s ERP, CRM, SCM system 
                                                 
11 In table 6 we only reported the first stage result when both sets of IVs are included. We also run separate 
models with only one set of IV. The result is very much consistent with what we see in table 6. This reflects 
that our two sets of IVs catch different variations in endogenous explanatory variables. 
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implementation (especially so for larger firms). This reflects the local competition for IT labor 
(IT-EMPLOYMENT reflects local demand for IT labor). MSA average IT salary is positively 
related with the implementation of CRM and SCM systems, especially for larger firms. This 
reflects the supply of IT labor. The F-statistics on the excluded instruments in the first-stage 
regression range from 55 to 101, and in all cases are significant at 1% level. We also calculated 
the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical threshold for weak instruments. Since the Stock and Yogo 
(2005) test only report critical values with 1, 2 or 3 endogenous regressors and between 3 and 30 
instruments, we were only able to estimate the critical values for the model without interactions. 
The minimum eigenvalue statistic is 190.8, which is much higher than the critical value of 9.53. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the IVs are weak.  
Table 7 presents the second-stage results. The results are generally consistent with the 
baseline models and the hypotheses. Model 1 indicates that ERP system has a positive impact on 
horizontal M&A, when the focal firm is large (at 0.05 level). Likewise, model 3 indicates that 
ERP system has a positive impact on conglomerate M&A, when the firm is larger (at 0.01 level). 
Also, CRM system has a negative impact (at 0.01 level) on pure vertical M&A when dynamism is 
low (model 2, 4 and 6). With higher dynamism, this negative impact gets smaller and eventually 
turns into positive. The result of SCM system is also consistent with the baseline model. Model 2 
and 6 suggest that SCM system is negatively related with pure vertical M&A when the supplier 
industry is less concentrated (at 0.1 significance level in model 2); but when the supplier industry 
concentration increases, the impact eventually becomes positive. This moderating effect is 
significant in model 2 (at 0.1 level) and model 6 (at 0.01 level).   
4.4 CEM and DD Analysis 
Using the CEM sample discussed in the empirical strategy section above, we estimated 3 sets of 
DD models for the impact of ERP, CRM and SCM system implementation on M&A. This 
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analysis supplements our baseline model in that it examines the within-firm variation in the data. 
In the DD analysis the M&A activity changes in firms that adopted ERP (or CRM, SCM) system 
are adjusted by the trend of M&A of similar control firms. Using the CEM sample, we estimated 
the following models for ERP, CRM and SCM systems samples respectively: (1) linear panel 
model with firm fixed effects; (2) linear panel model with matched pair fixed effects; (3) pooled 
Poisson model with robust SE clustered over firms. Tables 8 and 9 report results of DD analysis 
using the ERP, CRM and SCM system samples. Pooled Poisson model suggests that after 
implementing ERP system, the treated firm increases the number of horizontal and conglomerate 
M&A it engages in, even after adjusted by the time trend of M&A in the control firms, especially 
conglomerate M&A (table 8, model 5 and 6). This positive impact is particularly significant for 
larger firms. Model 1-3 of table 9 report the DD results for CRM system and model 4-6 for the 
SCM system. For the CRM system, both linear panel and pooled Poisson models indicate that 
even after adjusted by the time trend of M&A in the control group, the treated firm conducted a 
significantly smaller (larger) number of pure vertical M&A deals after implementing CRM 
system when it faces stable (unstable) demand (model 1-3). The linear panel model with firm 
fixed effects for the SCM system shows that after implementing SCM system, the treated firm 
conducted fewer pure vertical M&A compared to the control firms, when the supplier industry 
concentration was high (model 4 of table 9). The sign of the impact of SCM system is consistent 
with our baseline model (a negative impact); but the moderating effect of supplier industry 
concentration shows either non-significance (model 5 and 6) or a negative impact (model 4). We 
believe that this is due to the small sample size and the skewed distribution of supplier industry 
concentration in the DD analysis. Our SCM DD analysis has 161 firm-year observations 
(compared to 3,208 in the baseline model) with firms that face high supplier industry 
concentration being more sparse than the baseline sample. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
moderating effect is not significant or has a negative sign here.  
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4.5 Other Robustness Checks 
In addition to the above analysis, we also conducted other robustness checks.12 To exhaust all the 
industry influence in our baseline model, we also repeated the analysis with a full list of industry 
dummies (IO industries). The results show no difference qualitatively from the baseline models. 
Since enterprise system implementation may take multiple years, we run robustness analysis 
where we examine the 1-year and 2-year lagged effect of ERP, CRM and SCM systems. These 
models are generally consistent with our baseline model as well.  
Measurement error in the explanatory variables can cause inconsistent estimation of the 
coefficients under the classical errors-in-variables (CEV) assumption13 (Woodridge 2010). 
However, we have reason to believe that measure error in independent variables is not a 
significant issue in this study. First of all, the measures of ERP, CRM and SCM systems are 
based on information from each site of the firms. An employee directly involved in the 
management of the site was surveyed about the status of the accounting/finance, human resources 
management, workflow software, customer/salesforce management, and supply chain 
management modules. We coded these systems availability to be 1 only when they were specified 
as “installed”. Since specific questions about the presence of each module was asked, it is 
unlikely for the respondent to under- or over-report the availability of the module. Also, since 
different respondents were surveyed at the sites (i.e., each site had a different respondent) it is 
unlikely for the measurement errors of the sites (if any) within one firm to be correlated. Second, 
in order to improve the robustness of our measures of ERP, CRM and SCM system, we also used 
revenue of the site as an alternative weight. In addition, to focus on the ERP, CRM, and SCM 
system availability at the core sites of the focal firm, we calculated the same variables with only 
                                                 
12 These results are not included in the paper to conserve space, but are available upon request from the 
authors.  
13 The measurement error is uncorrelated with the unobserved explanatory variable with measurement 
error. 
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the large sites (more than 100 employees) or top sites (the largest sites whose number of 
employee comprises over 80% of total employees in the firm). The results are highly consistent 
with our baseline models. Finally, we argue that if respondents systematically overreport the 
availability of the different modules at their site, we should find a consistent relationship between 
ERP, CRM, and SCM systems and horizontal, pure vertical, and conglomerate M&A. However, 
that is not what we find. We find that ERP systems are generally positively related with 
horizontal and conglomerate M&A; and SCM and CRM systems are negatively related with pure 
vertical M&A, unless supplier industry is concentrated or industry dynamism is high. This may 
suggest that respondents are not systematically overreporting the implementation of enterprise 
system modules.  
In addition, we also checked the possible bias that the mapping from IO to NAICS 
industries might cause. In this paper, the definition of industry (389 IO industries) is from BEA 
Input-Output Accounts Data from 2007. Each IO industry has a one to one or one to many 
relationship with 3 to 5-digit 2007 NAICS codes. This mapping is more granular for 
manufacturing industries. Out of the 389 IO industries, 238 of them are in the manufacturing 
industry. In order to assess if the granularity of the mapping changes our results, we run separate 
analysis for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. The result shows that the positive 
impact of ERP system on horizontal M&A is only present for non-manufacturing industries. The 
CRM system results in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries are consistent with 
our baseline models. Also, the impact of SCM system on pure vertical M&A is significant in both 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. But the positive moderating effect of 
supplier industry concentration is only significant in the manufacturing industry. This is expected 
as consistent and predictable supplier relationship management is more important in the 
manufacturing context.   
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Further, this paper takes an efficiency perspective in examining the impact of enterprise 
systems on M&A i.e., the rationale for the impact of enterprise system on M&A is based on the 
impact of enterprise systems on internal and external coordination costs. There are other 
motivations for M&A besides efficiency, for example, anti-competitive motivation for both 
horizontal and non-horizontal M&A (Shenoy 2012). In order to tease out anti-competitive 
motivation for M&A, we removed M&A in our sample that possibly had an anti-competitive 
motivation. Based on the criteria provided in the horizontal and non-horizontal merger guidelines 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), we labelled a non-horizontal M&A as anti-competitive 
and removed it for the robustness check if: (1) the overall concentration of target market was over 
1800 HHI; (2) the acquirer already operated in the industry of the target as a minor sector; (3) the 
target firm was listed with a Forbes Sales 500 Rank when acquired. Using a similar approach, we 
followed the horizontal merger guidelines and removed horizontal M&A that possibly had an 
anti-competitive motivation. In addition, we also removed deals that were over 50% stock 
financed to tease out the possibility that the acquiring firm conducted an M&A deal to take 
advantage of the over-evaluation of their stock. The results show that when the anti-competitive 
and stock financed deals were removed, the economic significance of CRM and SCM systems on 
pure vertical M&A became stronger; and the economic significance of ERP system on horizontal 
and conglomerate M&A did not change.  
Finally, to tease out the possibility that target firm’s ERP, CRM and SCM systems lead to 
the results that we see in the baseline model, we conducted a case-control design; we constructed 
a sample that matched actual M&A (cases) with a set of synthetic counterfactual M&A deals 
(controls)—combinations of firms that could have merged but did not, using CEM (Rogan and 
Sorenson 2014.). By setting the unit of analysis at the transaction level, we were able to include 
both acquirer and target firm’s enterprise information systems and other factors that affect the 
likelihood of a M&A (Palepu 1986; Younge et al. 2015). The results on the acquirer side 
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enterprise systems are consistent with our baseline model; the results of target’s side enterprise 
systems show that the target firm’s ERP, CRM and SCM systems do not have significant impact 
on horizontal, pure vertical and conglomerate M&A. This may be due the fact that the acquirers 
in our sample are Fortune 1000 firms that are typically much larger than the targets and probably 
have superior IT capabilities than the targets; thus the acquirers replace the target’s IT systems 
(Tanriverdi and Uysal 2015) with their own IT system in the M&A integration process.  
5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
How does IT affect firm boundary has been an enduring topic of interest in the IS field. 
This literature suggests that IT is associated with less vertical integration and more 
diversification (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 1994; Dewan and Min 1998; Hitt 1999). There is 
also literature that suggests that IT enables firms to generate economic value from 
acquisitions by helping to integrate acquisitions (Tanriverdi and Uysal 2011; Tafti 2011). 
In contrast to the aforementioned literatures, this research examines how enterprise 
systems—ERP, CRM, and SCM systems are related to firm boundary through M&A. 
This paper makes important theoretical and empirical contributions.  
The primary theoretical contribution of this study is to make the argument that ERP, 
CRM, and SCM system, by reducing agency cost, encourage firms to achieve economies 
of scale through horizontal, vertical and conglomerate acquisitions, as enterprise systems 
can reduce the internal coordination cost associated with operating a larger firm; and that 
CRM and SCM systems, by reducing the transaction cost of coordinating activities with 
customers and suppliers, decrease the propensity to make vertical acquisitions. Thus, this 
paper links enterprise systems, Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics to 
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M&A; and examines how ERP, CRM, and SCM, by reducing internal and external 
coordination costs are related to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&A.   
The empirical contribution of this paper is that it reveals that ERP systems have a 
positive relationship with horizontal and conglomerate M&A as ERP systems can reduce 
internal coordination costs associated with operating a larger firm. This finding is 
consistent with prior work that suggests that IT investments are positively related with 
diversification (Dewan and Min 1998; Hitt 1999).  The empirical analysis also indicates 
that this effect is stronger if the potential acquirer is larger. A larger acquirer has more 
opportunities to achieve economies of scale by making a horizontal or conglomerate 
acquisition. However, a larger acquirer also suffers from higher diseconomies of scale; 
thus, a larger acquirer can derive greater benefits in reduction of internal coordination 
costs from ERP systems, which increases a larger firm’s incentive to make horizontal and 
conglomerate acquisitions.    
The empirical analysis also reveals that CRM (SCM) systems have a negative 
relationship with vertical M&A as CRM (SCM) systems can reduce the cost associated 
with coordinating with customers (suppliers), and thus CRM (SCM) systems allow firms 
to use information based coordination with customers (suppliers). This finding is 
consistent with prior research that suggests that IT investments are negatively related 
with vertical integration (Dewan and Min 1998; Hitt 1999). The analysis, however, also 
indicates that if the downstream industry is very unpredictable and dynamic that increases 
external coordination costs, then CRM systems facilitate ownership-based coordination 
by reducing the internal coordination cost associated with operating an integrated 
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network of downstream partners. Similarly, if the supplier industry is concentrated i.e., 
suppliers have market power that increases external coordination costs, then SCM 
systems are associated with more vertical M&A as SCM systems can reduce the internal 
coordination cost of operating a more integrated supply chain network; thus enabling 
ownership-based coordination.   
The key implication of the analyses is that as CRM and SCM systems can reduce 
internal as well as external coordination costs they may be used strategically. When 
industry dynamism and supplier concentration are low, since CRM and SCM systems can 
reduce external coordination costs, CRM (SCM) systems are negatively related with 
vertical M&A as CRM (SCM) systems can be used for information-based coordination 
with customers (suppliers). However, if the downstream sales are very unpredictable and 
external coordination costs are high; since CRM systems can be used to reduce the cost 
of operating a larger network with integrated downstream partners, CRM systems are 
positively related with vertical M&A as the focal firms can use CRM systems for 
ownership based coordination. Likewise, if the supplier industry is very concentrated and 
external coordination costs are high; since SCM systems can reduce the costs of 
operating a larger and more integrated supply chain network, SCM systems are positively 
related with vertical M&A as the focal firms can use SCM systems for ownership based 
coordination. Similarly, the analysis suggests that firms can achieve economies of scale 
by engaging in horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. Since ERP systems can reduce 
the cost of operating a larger firm, ERP system can encourage firms to achieve 
economies of scale by making horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. However, 
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beyond certain size, larger firms suffer from diseconomies of scale. Thus, larger firms 
can derive greater benefits in reduction in internal coordination cost from ERP systems 
(compared to smaller firms), and consequently ERP system provide larger firms greater 
incentive to make horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions.  
The findings of this paper have important implications for managers. Many firms 
have implemented ERP, CRM, and SCM systems to coordinate internal operations as 
well as coordinate activities with customers and suppliers (Hitt et al. 2002).  The findings 
of this paper suggest that internal and external coordination capabilities provided by ERP, 
CRM, and SCM systems also have implications for firm scope through M&A. Firms can 
achieve economies of scale through horizontal and conglomerate M&A. However, there 
is a cost associated with operating a larger firm. As ERP systems can reduce the internal 
coordination cost associated with operating a larger firm, a firm with ERP system may 
make horizontal and conglomerate M&A to achieve scale.  Likewise, the analysis 
suggests that if a firm operates in environments where downstream sales are not very 
unstable or suppliers are not very concentrated, then the focal firm does not need to make 
downstream or upstream acquisitions to improve vertical coordination. A CRM (SCM) 
system enabled information-based coordination is a less risky approach to improving 
vertical coordination.  However, if a focal firm operates in an environment which 
requires downstream coordination with very unpredictable sales or upstream coordination 
with a concentrated supplier industry, then CRM (SCM) systems that can reduce the cost 
of operating with an integrated customer (supplier) present acquisition of customer 
(supplier) as an alternative mechanism to improve vertical coordination.  
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The analysis has certain limitations that suggest directions for future research. This 
research examines the relationship between the presence of ERP, CRM and SCM systems 
and M&A activities. Future research may examine the relationship between actual use of 
ERP, CRM and SCM systems and M&A activities. For example, examining the 
relationship between use of ERP, CRM, and SCM systems to coordinate with industry 
partners, customers, and suppliers, and M&A activities may provide more refined 
understanding of the impact of enterprise systems on M&A. Future research can also 
examine the economic impact of the use of ERP, CRM and SCM systems for information 
and ownership based coordination with business partners. Does the use of ERP, CRM 
and SCM systems for information or ownership based coordination lead to higher 
performance? This research focused on the potential acquirers and the impact of 
acquirer’s ERP, CRM and SCM systems on the likelihood of making acquisitions. It is 
also likely that the implementation of ERP, CRM and SCM systems at potential targets 
influences a target firm’s likelihood of being acquired. It will also be interesting to 
examine how the implementation of enterprise systems affects a potential target firm’s 
likelihood of being acquired. We found that in our sample the target firm’s ERP, CRM 
and SCM systems did not have significant impact on horizontal, pure vertical and 
conglomerate M&A. However, the acquirers in our sample are Fortune 1000 firms that 
are typically much larger than the targets and probably have superior IT capabilities than 
the targets. Thus, the target’s IT systems are not a key consideration in the M&A 
decision. It will be important to extend this analysis to the more general case where 
acquirers are not large Fortune 1000 firms, and where acquirers and targets have 
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comparable IT capabilities. 
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Chapter II: Acquirers and Targets’ Enterprise Systems and Premium on 
M&A Deals 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have become increasingly popular in the last few 
decades. In 2014 82,354 M&A deals were completed around the world with a total deal 
value of 4,708 billion U.S. Dollars (Bureau van Dijk 2015).  In these deals, acquiring 
firms typically pay a significant premium above the market value of target firms to 
persuade shareholders to yield control to the acquiring firm. The average acquisition 
premium in the past decade paid by firms has been in the range of 30-50 percent of 
market value (Laamanen 2007). Further, there is considerable evidence from prior M&A 
events that 70-90 percent of the deals destroyed shareholder value for the acquiring firm 
(Christensen et. al 2011).  Why acquiring firms pay significant sums above the value 
that the market assigns to the target and circumstances when M&A deals create value 
for acquirers are both questions of great interest for researchers and for practitioners.   
Early work in M&A highlighted that the potential to gain efficiency enhancing 
scale economies (Singh and Montgomery 1987), and increasing market power 
(Chatterjee 1986, Kim and Singhal 1993) may be factors linked to acquisition 
premiums.  Empirical analyses also reveal the presence of bandwagon effects in 
acquisitions in industries during periods of expansion (McNamara, Haleblian and 
Dykes 2008). Studies have also implicated factors such as national regulatory factors 
such as accounting standards and shareholder rights (Rossi and Volpin 2004) and 
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sociocultural factors such as the ability to share resources and learning across national 
cultures (Stahl and Voight 2008) as explanatory of acquisition premiums.  Research 
also suggests that the value created in M&A is linked to strategic complementarity, 
cultural fit and the degree of post-merger integration (Bauer and Matzler 2013). 
However, while there are a variety of different streams of research on M&A that 
examine value creation and premiums, they each approach the issues involved from 
disparate but overlapping perspectives.  As a result, our overall understanding of M&A 
actions is fragmented and a fundamental managerial logic that unifies these disparate 
streams is lacking. To this end, our work focuses on premiums and value creation in 
M&A through the lens of resource coordination – a capability that is enhanced in 
firms’ adoptions of enterprise systems (Roberts, Galluch, Dinger and Grover 2012, 
Sarazzin and West 2011).  
M&A may allow firms to extend the deployment of their existing resources and 
capabilities to novel contexts (Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 1998; Kaul, 2012), creating 
value by improving the performance of the acquired firm (Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 
2012). This improvement in outcomes for the joint firm can arise from a variety of 
sources. For instance, the combined firm can enhance plant productivity, achieve better 
asset and knowledge utilization by allocating production more efficiently across 
multiple geographies (e.g. McGuckin & Nguyen, 1995), and improve service delivery 
(Banker, Chang, & Cunningham, 2003). The joint firm can also make better decisions 
by pooling information and sharing knowledge among the combined set of operating 
units (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman 2005).  Consistent with this logic, King, Slotegraaf 
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and Kesner (2008) found that the degree of resource complementarity between acquirer 
and target firms was positively related to abnormal returns for the acquiring firm.  The 
merger of Delta and Northwest in the airline industry and the merger of Office Max and 
Office Depot in the office supply industry are typical instances where the premiums 
(16.8% premium for Northwest, 4% premium for Office Max) were justified by the 
product-market, resource related and value chain synergies obtained by jointly 
coordinating the complementary assets and resources of the merged firms.  
In addition to the resource deployment perspective, acquisitions are also a 
means for the acquirers to obtain new resources and capabilities (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001, Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Kaul 2012; Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri, 2009) 
allowing them to bridge capability gaps (Capron and Mitchell, 2009) and enter new 
markets (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Lee and Lieberman, 2010).  In these instances, 
the rationalization and restructuring of processes within the broader sets of assets of the 
combined firm can create benefits from cross selling and branding of the larger 
portfolio of products.  The merger in 2010 of Ticketmaster, the leading concert 
promoter and seller of concert tickets with Live Nation, the firm that owned major 
concert venues and was an artist management firm with long term contracts with 
artistes like Madonna and U2 is an instance where the combination of concert 
promotion, venue management and artist management capabilities makes the combined 
firm more powerful and enhances its competitiveness (Rolling Stone 2010).  
Whether an M&A is executed to derive value from deploying current resources 
to novel contexts or for new resource acquisition, the ability to appropriately integrate 
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the processes of target and acquiring firms is the single most important factor is 
realizing synergy (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) and enhancing the performance of 
the combined firm (Zollo and Singh, 2004). In this vein, Capron (1999) relate 
integration to resource redeployment and knowledge transfer between the acquirer and 
the target and find that resource redeployment and knowledge transfer increased 
performance. The expectations of synergy in value creation through capability 
deployment and in capability acquisition and enhancement requires managers to 
redesign business processes and consolidate the multiple sets of diverse processes of 
previously separate businesses within a combined firm.  In the instance of the Delta 
and Northwest merger, the firms needed to consolidate assets such as lounges and gates 
in airports across the world. In the case of the Office Depot and Office Max merger the 
changes include implementing enterprise-wide changes such as rationalizing 
manufacturing and production facilities, streamlining logistics and procurement, 
harmonizing overlapping sales and support functions and developing joint brand 
strategies and marketing campaigns (Banker 2015).   
Increasingly, the ability of firms to integrate resources and processes depends 
largely on coordination capabilities provided by enterprise systems such as ERP 
Systems, CRM systems and SCM systems. Insights based on rich and detailed case 
studies in the IS literature suggest that complex business transformations involve a 
range of choices regarding the standardization of business processes and the integration 
of business processes across functional areas and business units (Ross and Weill 2004, 
Beath and Ross 2010).  As information systems become increasingly central to the 
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management and operational control of enterprises, it is thus not a surprise that recent 
studies highlight that realized outcomes in M&A initiatives hinge on the challenges of 
merging the complex information systems of target and the acquiring firms (Yoo, 
Lyytinen, Heo 2004; Mehta and Hirschheim 2007).  In line with this logic, IT M&A 
integration capabilities of acquiring firms are central to realizing the value in M&A 
(Tanriverdi and Du 2011; Tanriverdi & Uysal, 2011). Consistent with the resource-
based view of value creation in firms we suggest that enterprise systems installed at the 
acquiring and target firms are central facilitators of the integration processes in M&A 
initiatives. In this paper we examine the premiums and value from M&A deals from a 
coordination capabilities perspective. We contend that premiums paid and value 
realized are likely to be related to the coordination capabilities linked to Enterprise 
Systems in acquiring and target firms.  
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
M&A are seen as contests between firms in the market for corporate control over the 
productive resources of potential targets.  The central argument underlying this view is 
that the lower the stock price of the target relative to what it could be with more 
efficient resource utilization and management (after acquisition), the more attractive the 
take-over becomes to acquiring firms who believe that they can manage the combined 
firm more efficiently than currently possible when the target firm is a standalone entity.  
However, there are often multiple potential acquirers with strategically related resources 
that can create value through synergies and whose estimates of the economic value 
created from acquiring the target firm are comparable. As a result, the competitive 
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bidding among them to acquire the target firm raises the premium (above the market 
price of the target) to acquire the target firm to equal the synergistic gains from the 
acquisition.  Thus, when markets for corporate control are perfectly competitive, 
abnormal returns to acquiring firms are expected to be null (Barney 1988).  This logic 
arises from the observation that premiums paid to acquire target firms in competitive 
markets where multiple firms contend to acquire the target firm rise to equal the net 
present value of the future stream of revenues created by the synergistic combination of 
target and acquiring firm resources.  This theoretical expectation of no abnormal returns 
accruing to acquiring firms has consistently been confirmed in empirical studies of the 
issue (Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988).  
In particular, prior research suggests that acquiring firms are likely to experience 
abnormal returns only in instances when markets for corporate control are imperfect 
(Barney 1988, Chatterjee 1986, 1992).  This occurs when an acquiring firms possesses 
unique value creating resources and capabilities that competing bidders do not possess 
and competitors cannot duplicate the synergies and cash flows attributable to these 
resources. In such instances, the competitive bidding process raises the target premium 
only to the level of the synergistic value of other potential acquirers. The incremental 
value attributable to the acquiring firm’s unique capabilities are reflected in the 
abnormal returns to the acquiring firm. Further, for this market imperfection to be 
sustained and create abnormal returns for the acquirer, the resources endowments or 
capabilities that create the synergistic value need to be complex and surrounded by 
causal ambiguity since competing firms would otherwise be able to duplicate this 
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resource and appropriate the unique value for themselves. Situations and contingencies 
associated with abnormal returns for acquiring firms therefore continue to be of great 
interest both to practitioners and academics (Capron and Pistre 2002).   
Prior research highlight that the greater the integration of the knowledge and 
resources of the acquirer and target firm post acquisition, the greater is the performance 
of the combined firm (Zollo and Singh 2004). Recent work suggests that the IT enabled 
capability of firms to integrate business processes and operations across multiple 
businesses is a significant contributor to firm performance after M&As in both the short 
run and the long run (Tanriverdi and Uysal 2010).  Increasingly, these firm capabilities 
are based on investments by firms in enterprise systems that allow managers to integrate 
resources across the enterprise to realize resource synergies of multiple business units 
and minimize disruptions during M&A integration. Enterprise system implementations 
are complex multi-year projects that are successful and create advantages when they are 
driven by a vision for the role of information technologies in the firm (Ross and Weill 
2006, Robertson and Fonstad, 2006).  For instance, Tanriverdi and Du (2011) highlight 
how EMC’s wide set of enterprise systems for Financial accounting, Human Resource 
Management, Salesforce Management, Customer Service, Indirect fulfilment, Logistics 
and Manufacturing enabled the firm to effectively integrate the business operations of 
the 50 business that it acquired between 2005 and 2010 to become a vendor of 
comprehensive hardware and solutions to large enterprises. The integration of business 
processes across multiple units is a complex task that involves a large number of 
interdependent processes that need to be coordinated between businesses that often 
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prioritize the achievement of their individual unit objectives rather than the broader 
enterprise goal (Ross, Weill and Robertson 2006).   
Cross-business information technology integration capabilities that allow firms 
to integrate IT infrastructures, combine IT applications such as human resources and 
vendor management systems and IT strategy management processes across business 
units enable firms to appropriate gains from synergies in M&A activities (Tanriverdi 
and Uysal 2010).  The work of Du (2015) highlights the variety of capabilities provided 
by a firm’s IT assets (i.e., IT extensiveness) and the level of IT Standardization of IT 
infrastructure and applications as important determinants of the flexibility of IT 
resources in M&A integration. Greater IT extensiveness and IT standardization within 
the acquiring firm is likely to help managers make discriminating choices to integrate  
business processes across business units including the target firm to translate the 
potential synergies from resource combination into actual value.  This leads us to 
suggest that the greater the IT extensiveness and the IT Standardization of a firm’s 
enterprise systems, the greater is the unique value a firm can create through synergistic 
resource combinations with a target firm in an M&A. This is likely to involve the new 
combinations of knowledge and firm resources into resource bundles that create unique 
opportunities for new products, service and new avenues for growth for the combined 
firm (Argyres and Zenger 2012).  The capabilities provided by enterprise systems for 
resource coordination are also likely to allow the firm to accomplish cross-unit process 
integration with minimal disruption to business operations, reducing the overall costs of 
the integration process.  Therefore, the combined effect of the enhanced potential for 
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value creation and the reduced costs of post-merger integration are likely to position the 
firm advantageously with respect to the value it can create from acquiring target firms in 
comparison with other firms also bidding for the target. The incremental value created 
by the IT competencies are unlikely to be duplicated by competitors and are thus likely 
to be retained by the acquiring firm. We therefore hypothesize that   
H1a: The greater the extensiveness of the enterprise systems at the acquiring 
firm, the greater is the abnormal return to the acquiring firm. 
H1b: The greater the standardization of the enterprise systems at the acquiring 
firm, the greater is the abnormal return to the acquiring firm. 
 
2.1 M & A Premiums 
The strategic motives for acquirers in M&A are driven by their desire to derive benefits 
from the potential synergies from integrating the resources of target firms and enhance 
overall enterprise performance.  The extent of benefits the acquirer can realize in future 
periods from the acquisition is an assessment that managers in acquiring firms need to 
make when they enter the bidding contest for a target firm.  In making this judgment, 
acquiring firms face ex-ante information costs associated with the difficulty of 
identifying and evaluating both the resources and capabilities of target firms and the 
synergies from combining with the target. While the due diligence process allows firms 
to obtain detailed and reliable private information from the target firms about the 
target’s current financial position, future projections and the valuation of their assets; it 
often does not convey details about the quality of a target’s resources and the target’s 
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ability to be integrated into the acquiring firm.  A typical instance of an acquirer mis-
estimating the synergy benefits is illustrated in the acquisition of the Boston Globe by 
the New York Times for $1.1 Billion in 1993 (Christenson et. al 2011).  The acquisition 
was justified by the expectation of operating synergies from combining the resources of 
the two well established firms in the same industry operating in different markets.  
However, after acquisition, the New York Times faced considerable resistance to 
changes from the entrenched culture of the 120 year old Boston Globe that created 
difficulties in realizing the expected operational synergies. The editorial and reporting 
staff of the Boston Globe preferred to retain their independence and the labor unions 
involved in printing and other operations complicated and hampered the streamlining of 
back office and administrative processes.  Most of the synergistic benefits projected for 
the acquisition never materialized and The Times finally divested the Boston Globe for 
$70M in 2013 (NY Times Aug 3, 2013).  Similarly, Arby’s and Wendy’s merged in 
2008 in a deal valued at $2.3B with the expectation that combining the resources of the 
two firms would create a world class company with the scale and expertise to enhance 
their competitive position in the restaurant industry.  The firms expected that the 
combination would enhance operational efficiencies, enable innovative new products 
and lower costs through the sharing of administrative services (ref news release).  
However, the combined company failed to realize the expected synergy benefits and 
struggled to merge the operations of the two firms which continued to be operated 
independently till Arby’s was divested in 2011 for $430 Million.  
Each of these represents instances of acquisitions that involved significant 
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premiums and not achieving the expected synergistic benefits of relatedness and 
complementarity.  These instances highlight the ex-ante difficulty of identifying and 
evaluating both the capabilities of target firms and the complexity of implementing the 
changes to achieve synergies from combining operations with the target.  Target firms 
have natural incentives to inflate their representation of the quality of their firm in order 
to command a higher sale price, further contributing to the information asymmetries that 
acquiring firms have to resolve.  
Prior research has suggested that high premiums in M&A deals are linked to 
agency considerations such as senior executives engaging in opportunistic behaviors 
that create personal gains since acquisitions that increase firm size also increase 
executive compensations as well as prestige ((Trautwein 1990). One of the widely cited 
explanations for M&A premiums is from the work of Hayward and Hanbrick (1997) 
whose empirical analysis suggests that the level of CEO hubris and exaggerated self-
confidence from past performance, media praise and importance signaled by high CEO 
pay are associated with higher premiums in M&A and lower firm performance after 
M&A events. This particular explanation is also supported in recent work suggesting the 
firms with CEOs with a high level of overconfidence in their own judgments also pay 
higher premiums in M&A deals (Malmendier and Tate 2008).  However, while the CEO 
and top management team does exert considerable influence on decisions in M&A 
activities, agency based explanations for critical decisions that view M&As decisions 
from an individual level of analysis appear unsatisfactory since these important 
decisions generally involve a large number of individuals from the Business 
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Development and Strategy groups, investment bankers, lawyers and business 
consultants (Hitt et. al 2001 book).   
An alternative perspective suggests M&A premia as being driven by group 
characteristics and shared perspectives within interorganizational networks (Haunschild 
1994, Bechkman and Haunschild 2002).  M&A premiums paid by acquirers are 
influenced by premia paid in prior deals by other firms linked to the focal firm through 
board interlocks and to the premia paid by other firms advised by the same professional 
firm (Haunschild 1994).  Beckman and Haunschild (2002) find that network learning is 
an important determinant of premiums and that firms tied to others with heterogeneous 
prior premium experience tend to pay less for their acquisitions and have better 
performing acquisitions than those tied to others with homogeneous experience.  
M&A premia are clearly judgments about firm value that acquiring firms make 
based on uncertain and ambiguous information inputs and it stands to reason that 
network learning plays an important role in determining premiums.  The findings of 
Beckman and Haunschild (2007) that acquiring firms pay lower premiums when their 
network partners have completed deals of diverse sizes provides evidence that M&A 
premiums are informed by heuristics about valuation that are collectively refined by 
firms pooling their M&A experiences in inter-organizational networks.  
These arguments thus provide credence to perspectives in the literature that 
M&A premia, rather than being linked to agency related causes and individual failings, 
should instead be viewed as imperfect judgments by well-meaning groups with limited 
or incorrect information and difficulties in seeking inputs from knowledgeable 
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individuals, factors that all point to decision making hampered by limitations in 
information processing capabilities (Sirower 1997, Villalong and McGahan 2005).  The 
overpayment reflected in the premium is higher when it is more difficult for the 
acquiring firm to evaluate the value of synergies from the combination (Laamanen 
2007).  Problematic decisions in M&A contexts thus reflect the limitations in making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity (Puranam, Powell and Singh 
2006).  
Sirower (1997) suggests that M&A premia are caused by individuals and groups 
making decisions while being unfamiliar with or not fully sharing critical elements of 
the firm’s acquisition strategy.  Premia are also inflated by a lack of adequate 
information available to decision makers regarding the target firm and specifics of the 
operating environment and by mistaken assumptions regarding future trajectories.  For 
instance, Sirower (1997) highlights how acquirers can arrive at inflated assessments of a 
target’s value when they fail to consider critical contingencies such as changes to 
regulatory and financial factors that may drastically alter key assumptions incorporated 
in financial projections.  Also, M&A premia may also be inflated by not fully 
accounting for the complexity of the integration process.  As Christensen et. al (2011) 
observe:  “every day, the wrong companies are purchased for the wrong purpose, the 
wrong measures of value are applied in pricing the deals, and the wrong elements are 
integrated into the wrong business models. Sounds like a mess – and it has been a mess. 
But it need not be.“ (last page).  
This highlights that firms’ overpayment in M&A is linked to poorer information 
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processing capabilities and that lead to incorrect judgments and poorer decision making. 
We suggest that firms that have invested in enterprise systems across a larger variety of 
functional areas, with higher ES extensiveness are likely to have the advantage of being 
able to consolidate and obtain detailed information that can provide a more realistic 
picture of potential synergies. Further, the level of ES standardization with in the firm 
enhances the quality of the information environment available to make the M&A.  For 
instance, firms where senior executives have full visibility to the pool of managerial 
talent made possible by a unified HR system across all their divisions can easily identify 
individuals with knowledge and specialized experience in the business, geography and 
the context of a target firm being considered, to derive inputs to validate judgments 
made by the executive team.  An integrated information environment characterized by 
high ES extensiveness and high ES standardization can enable executive teams to draw 
on dashboards presenting analytics on detailed plant data or sales from different 
geographies and run simulations to project the synergies and value gained from 
acquiring the resources of potential targets.  The support for executive decisions 
incorporated in ES can help managers visualize scenarios and outcomes for the firm 
under different sets of changes to environmental conditions.  For instance, Christenson 
et. al (2011) provide anecdotal evidence to suggest that acquisitions made for the 
purpose of cross-selling are only occasionally successful.  To verify if this claim is 
indeed a valid concern in their own industry, decision makers in enterprises with access 
to an integrated and standardized ES infrastructure would be able to extract divisional 
sales data on similar contexts and empirically confirm if this was the case in their 
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industry or in the context of the target. 
Further, the processes of decision making in contexts with high levels of ES 
extensiveness and ES standardization are likely to be more disciplined and systematic.  
Such an environment would allow collaborative decision making as well as enable a 
wider group of individuals from across different functions and business units to be 
easily polled and called upon for inputs. The decision processes for M&A in such firms 
are therefore less likely to lead to escalations of commitment (Haunschild, Davis-Blake 
and Fichman 1994) and have fewer biases in decision making such as overlooking 
negative information revealed late in the process (Puranam, Singh and Powell 2006). 
Overall, we suggest that the level of ES extensiveness and the level of ES 
standardization which reflect the quality of the information and knowledge 
infrastructure used to support decision making can help firms make better judgments 
regarding the value gained by acquiring target resources.  This leads to  
H2a: The greater the extensiveness of the enterprise systems at the acquiring 
firm, the lower are the premiums paid in M&A deals. 
H2b: The greater the standardization of the enterprise systems at the acquiring 
firm, the lower are the premiums paid in M&A deals. 
2.2 Target Firm Perspective  
Prior research on information technology investments suggests that these investments 
can create significant value for firms (Aral and Weill). However, studies also highlight 
that the complementary changes to operational processes and organizational structures 
associated with technology adoption can be disruptive, leave firms facing competitive 
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disadvantages and are thus potentially risky (Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004, Dewan, Shi 
and Gurbuxani 2007).  Studies of the expectations of value creation by the stock market 
linked to firms IT investments present a mixed picture.  Firms investing in IT 
experienced abnormal returns only for innovative applications of technology (Dos 
Santos et. al 1993) or when technologies are novel as in the case of e-commerce 
technologies (Subramani and Walden 2001).  Some studies suggest that IT investments 
enhance market value for small firms rather than for large firms (Im, Dow and Grover 
2001) while others find IT investment announcements enhancing market value only for 
investments viewed as transformational and in industries where technologies are viewed 
as being strategic (Dehning et. al 2003). Some studies even find IT investments 
reducing market valuations (Hunter 2003). Studies examining Enterprise Systems 
announcements suggest that enhancements in market values for ES projects high in 
functional scope (number of modules) and extent of deployment (number of sites) than 
for those where the investments are more narrow (Ranganathan and Brown 2006). 
Recent studies provide a more nuanced view, suggesting that IT investments reduce 
downside risks and enhance competitive performance when these investments are aimed 
at enhancing the quality of decision making and enhancing innovation related processes 
(Otim, Dow, Grover and Wong 2012). Further, these benefits are larger for firms that 
lead their industries in making technology investments than firms that are late adopters.  
Taken together, these studies provide compelling evidence that information 
technology investments contribute to considerable asymmetries in assessments of 
benefits between the stock market and managers within the firm and that target firms 
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with significant investments in technology are difficult for analysts in the market, and 
external to the firm, to appropriately value. Since markets are likely to adopt a 
conservative stance in valuing firms, this suggests that a firm’s market value may not 
fully represent the true value of the future cash flows created through its IT investments. 
This asymmetry, arising from the difficulty of assessing the value created 
through a firm’s IT investments by the market, has significant consequences for the 
premiums paid for a target firm with significant investments in enterprise systems.  
Acquirers use investment advisors and perform detailed analyses of target firms’ capital 
investments and the information systems supporting firm processes as part of the due 
diligence process (Yetton et. al 2013).  Further, since a target firm is motivated to 
compensate for their conservative valuation by providing considerable evidence to 
signal the value created by their ES investments to potential acquirers (Reuer, Tong and 
Wu 2012), acquiring firms are likely to arrive at a private assessment of the target’s 
value that are higher than those of the market.   
Further, since shareholders of target firm are also likely to recognize the 
conservative assessment of value created by the firm’s Enterprise systems investments 
by the market, they are unlikely to sell their shares to acquirers unless they are paid a 
premium above the current market price.  Both ES extensiveness and ES standardization 
(that reflects the firm’s managerial quality in integrating the variety of firm operations) 
are likely to be related to higher future benefit streams. As a result, the asymmetry 
between the market’s valuation and the private valuation is likely to be higher in targets 
with more extensive scope and scale (ES systems that are more extensive and ES that 
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are more standardized). Further, ES extensiveness and ES standardization of a target 
firm are likely to enhance the private, difficult-to-imitate benefits that an acquirer can 
gain through combining the resources of the target with their own.  Higher levels of ES 
extensiveness and ES standardization are also likely to simplify the complexity of 
process reconfiguration and restructuring in the post-acquisition period and reduce the 
overall costs of integration, leading to a greater assessment of the value of the target and 
greater premia.  We therefore hypothesize that  
H3a: The greater the extensiveness of the enterprise systems at the target firm, 
the high the premiums paid in M&A deals. 
H3b: The greater the standardization of the enterprise systems at the target firm, 
the higher the premiums paid in M&A deals. 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL TESTING 
3. 1. Sample construction 
I use data on merger and acquisition announcements from year 2009 to 2014. In our 
sample, both the acquirer and target firms are public firms headquartered in the United 
State or Canada. The M&A announcements are extracted from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database. Our dataset combines data from the following five sources: 
(1) Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database provides information on mergers and 
acquisitions, including acquirer and target firm information, deal characteristics and 
premium paid for the target firm, (2) Compustat provides the firm-level control variables, 
(3) Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides stock price information. 
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Market capitalization of the acquiring and target firms, as well as the cumulative 
abnormal return are both calculated using the outstanding share and stock price data 
provided by CRSP, (4) Harte & Hanks CI database (Harte & Hanks). Explanatory 
variables including enterprise system implementation (extensiveness and standardization) 
are obtained from the Harte-Hanks CI database, and (5) Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The industry relatedness data is drawn from BEA.  
There are two major samples used in this paper. The first one matches the 
acquirer in the merger and acquisition announcements to all the other data sources 
mentioned above (acquirer sample). The second sample matches the target firm to other 
data sources. The following table provides the details on how the acquirer sample and 
target samples are generated.  
 CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
ACQUIRER SAMPLE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
TARGET SAMPLE 
STEP 
1 
Extract SDC deals.  
 
Extract all the SDC deal announcements 
between year 2009 and 2014.  
 Remove the M&A announcements 
with deal form or type being 
buyback, exchange offer, 
recapitalization, repurchases, and 
self tender offer.  
 Keep all the deals with publicly 
traded acquirers.  
 
 
Extract SDC deals.  
 
Extract all the SDC deal 
announcements between year 
2009 and 2014.  
 Remove the M&A 
announcements with 
deal form or type being 
buyback, exchange 
offer, recapitalization, 
repurchases, and self 
tender offer.  
 Keep all the deals with 
publicly traded target 
firms.  
 
STEP 
2 
Match the acquirer to Harte & Hanks 
database.  
 
Used standardized firm names to link SDC 
Match the target to Harte & 
Hanks database.  
 
Used standardized firm names 
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acquirers to Harte & Hanks firms. The 
standardization of firm name comes from 
the NBER patent data project, which 
matches patent data to Compustat.  
 
 
to link SDC target firm to Harte 
& Hanks firms.  
 
STEP 
3 
Match to Compustat.  
 
Match the data in step 2 to Compustat using 
ticker and CUSIP of the acquirer provided 
in SDC (validated by the name of the firm).  
 
Match to Compustat.  
 
Match the data in step 2 to 
Compustat using ticker and 
CUSIP of the target provided in 
SDC (validated by the name of 
the firm).  
 
 
 
STEP 
4 
 
 Remove the deal if the acquirer’s 
market-to-book ratio or ROE is 
higher than 100 (Schwert, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,935 M&A announcements matched. 
 
 Whenever there are 
several bids for the same 
target (occuring within 
one year of the first bid), 
we keep only the first 
bid (to remove the 
possible confounding 
effects from other bids). 
 Remove the deal if the 
target’s market-to-book 
ratio or ROE is higher 
than 100 (Schwert, 
2000).  
 
 
908 M&A accouncements 
matched. 
 
 
 
3. 2. Measurements 
Dependent variables:  
I use an event study methodology (Brown and Warner 1980 1985) to study the forward-
looking expectation of the capital market on merger and acquisition announcements. The 
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assumption here is that the capital market is efficient, i.e., all the publicly available and 
relevant information on the acquiring and target firms is incorporated and reflected in the 
stock price. There are two sets of dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the 
offer premium. It is measured as the premium of offer price to target closing stock price 4 
weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((offer price – 
target closing stock price 4 week prior) / target closing stock price 4 week prior) * 10014. 
The second dependent variable measures the market reaction to the announcement of the 
M&A deal. It is defined as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), measured relative to a 
CRSP value-weighted market model. I used multiple measures of CAR:  
 CAR_runup is market-adjusted return to the stock trading days (-63, -1) before the 
announcement of the deal (Schwert 2000).  
 
Where  is the return for a sale to the acquiring or target firm on trading day t,  
is the return on the Standard & Poor's Composite Index on day t. The market model 
regression parameters,  and , are estimated using data for the 253 trading days 
ending at day -64,  
 CAR_markup is market adjusted return to the stock in trading days (0, 126) after the 
announcement of the deal (Schwert 2000). See the formula for CAR_runup above.  
 CAR_premium is the sum of CAR_runup and CAR_markup.  
                                                 
14 I also used premium of offer price to target closing stock price 1 weeks prior to the original 
announcement date to check the robustness of our first dependent variable.  
  66 
 CAR_(-2,2) is a cumulative abnormal return in a five day window around the 
announcement of the merger and acquisition deal (-2, 2), where the announcement 
day is day 0. See the formula for CAR_runup above. The market model regression 
parameters,  and , are estimated using data from trading day -205 to -6: 
 
Independent variables:  
The first set of independent variables is the enterprise systems (ES) of the acquiring and 
target firms. These two variables are calculated from information provided by Harte & 
Hanks database. For each site of the focal firm, Harte & Hanks conducted surveys on an 
employee at the site who is directly involved in information technology management at 
the site. The survey asked the respondent the status of implementation of a list of 
modules of ES (installed or planned). We coded the module availability as 1 when it is 
listed as “installed”. 
ES extensiveness. The ES extensiveness variable is constructed using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) on the following modules: accounting/finance (ACC), 
human resources (HR) and workflow (WORKFLOW), customer relationship 
management (CRM) and supply chain management (SCM) software. Harte-Hanks 
database provides information on ACC, HR and WORKFLOW, CRM and SCM module 
implementation in each site of the firm (1 if implemented, 0 otherwise). ACC, HR and 
WORKFLOW, CRM and SCM module implementation at the site was  weighted using 
the number of employees to generate firm-level module implementation. Then I 
conducted Principal Component Analysis on the firm-level ACC, HR, WORKFLOW, 
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CRM and SCM module implementations. From the result of the PCA, I take the first 
principal component (it has an eigenvalue of 3.57 and is the only component with an 
eigenvalue higher than 1) as my measure of ES extensiveness.  
ES standardization. Within the same firm different sites could be using different vendors 
for the same ES software. For example, one site in General Motors implemented 
PeopleSoft for CRM while other sites are using Salesforce. While ES extensiveness 
captures the scope/breadth of the ES tools used by the focal firm, another aspect of ES is 
within the same tool how standardized it is across member sites of the firm. I use an 
entropy measure to measure the diversity of the software products used across the sites of 
the firm. The ES standardization for software  at time  is calculated as follows: 
 
Where  is a type of software – for example, CRM software.  stands for a vendor within 
the software .  is the number of different vendors of software  used by the firm. 
 is the size of the focal firm (total number of employees).   is the size of the 
sites who use the  vendor for software . The average of the five STD measures for 
ACC, HR, WORKFLOW, CRM and SCM software is used as the measure of ES 
standardization.  
The second set of independent variables is the vertical and horizontal relationship 
between the acquiring and target firms’ industries. Given the primary industries (6 digit 
NAICS code) the acquiring and target firms are in, I use the Input-Output Use table from 
the BEA and construct a continuous Vertical Relatedness Index (VRI) for every industry 
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pair. For each industry pair i and j, the VRI is defined as the maximum of the dollar value 
of input from industry i (j) in order to produce one dollar of industry j (i)’s output (Fan 
and Lang 2000).  The horizontal complementarity coefficient measures the degrees to 
which industries i and j share their output and input. From the Use Table provided by 
BEA, I compute for each industry the percentage of its output supplied to (percentage of 
its inputs required from) each intermediate industry k, denoted as  ( ). For each pair 
of industries i and j, the correlation coefficient between  and  (  and ) across 
all k except for i and j is calculated as the output correlation (input correlation). A large 
output (input) correlation suggests a significant overlap in the markets to which industries 
i and j sell their products (the inputs industries i and j need). The horizontal 
complementarity coefficient is the average of the output and input correlation, i.e., 
 (Fan and Lang 2000). 
Control variables:  
I control for other factors mentioned in the literature that might affect premium and 
market reaction to a M&A announcement. These control variables include deal 
characteristics, accounting performance of the acquirer and target, financial advisors and 
anchoring effects.  
Deal characteristics:  
 Hostile. An acquisition is considered hostile if the attitude field in SDC was 
marked as unsolicited or hostile.  
 Tender offer. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if the bid involved a 
tender offer (as recorded in SDC).  
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 Toehold. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target’s 
common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% at the bid announcement 
date or zero otherwise (Officer, 2003).  
 Merger of Equals. Merger of Equals indicator is 1 when the target and acquirer in 
a stock swap transaction have approximately the same market capitalization, and 
the ownership of the new entity will be owned roughly 50/50 by the target and 
acquirer shareholders. Both companies should also have close to equal 
representation on the board of the new company (defined in SDC).  
 Number of competing bids for the same target.  
Financial advisors and anchoring effects:  
 Anchoring effect. In order to control for the anchoring effect, I added the 
preceding acquisition premium as a control variable. The preceding acquisition 
premium is the premium paid by another firm that made the acquisition directly 
preceding the focal deal in a given country and target industry (four-digit SIC 
code). This measure is consistent with Melhotra et. al. 2015.  
 Financial Advisor average premium. I also control for the average premium paid 
on all transactions involving the same investment banking firm during the prior 
three years (Haunschild 1994). When multiple advisors are used, the average is 
used.  
 
Accounting performance:  
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 Return on equity (ROE) measured as the ratio of earnings to average equity for 
the prior fiscal year.  
 Market/book (M/B) ratio measured as the ratio of the year-end market value of 
common stock to the book value of equity for the prior fiscal year.  
 Size measured as the log of equity capitalization (in thousands of dollars) on the 
last day of the year prior to the deal announcement.  
Selection CAR:  
 Selection_CAR is the additional variable added to the first stage of the Heckman 
two-step model. In order to estimate the Heckman two-step selection model, we 
need to add at least one additional variables in the first stage that is not included 
in the second stage model. This additional variable we used is the cumulative 
abnormal return of the firm’s stock for the previous two years (Palepu, 1986; 
Comment and Schwert, 1995; labelled as selection_CAR). It is estimated using 
the third year prior to the forecast year with CRSP value-weighted market model. 
Selection_CAR measures the stock market performance of the focal firm, which 
affects the likelihood of a firm acquiring or being acquired. Firms with high 
performance tend to acquirer and the bad performers tend to get acquired 
(Comment and Schwert 1995; Gaspar, et. al, 2005).  
3. 3. Empirical strategy 
A potential selection bias is that ES implementation (extensiveness and standardization) 
increases the likelihood of a firm entering an M&A transaction, either being an acquiring 
or target firm. Only when the acquisition takes place is it possible to observe the outcome 
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variables in this paper: premium and stock market reaction. To address this issue, I use 
Heckman two-step correction to solve the potential selection bias.  
Acquirer selection model:  
In the first stage, a Probit model of the likelihood of acquiring is estimated.  
 
 is the latent unobservable variable that represents the value of acquiring the target 
firm.   is a dummy variable  indicating if a M&A deal took place: 
.  
In order to estimate the above Probit model (first stage of the Heckman two-step 
model), I expanded the data beyond the firms that were taken over. I constructed the 
universe of the firms, that is composed of firms that have a chance to acquire or get 
acquired from 2009 to 2014. The universe of the firms is constructed by matching all the 
Harte & Hanks firms available in Compustat using standardized company names 
(validated by address and size of the firm). 4,976 unique firms are matched across six 
year from 2009 to 2014. 
There is one more complication in the acquirer selection model: if a firm decided 
to acquire, only when the target firm is publicly traded is it possible to observe the 
premium. Therefore, I estimated two Probit models in the first stage: (1) estimate the 
likelihood of a firm in the universe of firms to acquire in a specific year; (2) given that 
the firm is an acquirer in that year, estimate the likelihood of the acquirer taking over a 
public target. Explanatory variables in (1) include potential acquirer ES extensiveness 
and standardization, size of the potential acquirer (log of market capitalization from the 
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previous year), accounting performance including ROE and market-to-book ratio from 
the previous year and selection_CAR. Explanatory variables in (2) include 
selection_CAR, size of the acquirer and market-to-book ratio.  
Target selection model:  
The target selection model is similar to the acquirer selection model. The same universe 
of firms is used for the estimation; the only difference being that in the first stage, only 
one Probit model is estimated: the likelihood of a firm being acquired. The variables used 
to do the first stage estimation include ES extensiveness and standardization, size of the 
potential target firm (log of market capitalization from the previous year), accounting 
performance including ROE and market-to-book ratio from the previous year and 
selection_CAR (the additional variable added in stage 1 estimation, consistent with 
Gaspar et. al. 2005).  
4. RESULTS 
4. 1. Descriptive statistics 
Acquirer sample:  
The acquirer sample contains 4,935 M&A bids. Both acquiring and target firms in this 
sample are firms headquartered in the United States or Canada. All the acquirers are 
publicly traded firms. Among these deals, 2% of them are tender offers, while 1% show 
hostile attitude from the target firm towards the bidder (table 10). The average premium 
of these deals is 53%. However, only about 8% of these deals disclosed the premium 
information (407/4,935). These deals on average have much lower acquirer abnormal 
return than the target abnormal return in the target sample.  Compared to the universe of 
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the firms, the firms in the acquirer sample have lower level of ES standardization 
(compare table 10 with table 14). These acquirers (average ROE equals 0.05) also 
performed better than firms in the universe (average ROE equals 0.01). However, the 
CAR from the previous two years show that firms in the acquirer sample (selection CAR 
is 0.02) underperform compared to the other firms in the universe (selection CAR is 
0.06).  
Target sample:  
The target sample contains 908 deals. These target firms are all publicly traded firms 
headquartered in The United States or Canada. Among these deals, 15% of them are 
tender offers, while 7% show hostile attitude from the target firm towards the bidder 
(table 12). On average, the premium calculated using stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement of the deal is 42%. These deals also show a positive market reaction 
towards the target firm on average. Compared to the universe of the firms, the firms in 
the target sample have higher level of ES extensiveness and standardization (compare 
table 12 with table 14). The firms in the target sample have slightly higher market to 
book ratio on average (1.9) compare to the universe of firms (1.57). However, the CAR 
from the previous two years show that firms in the target sample (selection CAR is -0.08) 
underperform compared to the other firms in the universe (selection CAR is 0.06).  
4. 2. Sample selection bias 
Ideally, I have complete data on all the biddings occurred. However, the data is not 
complete for many deals when it comes to ES information, premium, stock-price 
performance and other control variables. For example, between year 2009 to 2014; 5,717 
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mergers and acquisition deals occurred with public target firms headquartered in Canada 
or United States. However, only 3,149 of them have the premium information available 
(based on stock price 4 weeks prior). Also, only 3,076 of the target firms can be matched 
to Compustat.  
Tables 15.1-15.4 compare the acquirer sample with all the deals (2009-2014) 
occurred with both acquirer and target headquartered in Canada or United States and 
acquirer being a public firm (22,498 M&As). Tables 15.1-15.4 have the same full sample 
(22,498 deals) with different complete samples. For example, table 15.1 shows that only 
214 deals out of the 22,498 have complete data on premium, ES extensiveness and all the 
control variables. Highlighted variables indicate a significant difference in mean between 
the full and complete samples (two-sample t test). Table 15.1 indicates that compared to 
all the other deals that happened between 2009 and 2014, the acquirer sample has a 
significantly higher proportion of hostile deals, tender offers, and merger of equals. These 
deals with complete data are more vertically and horizontally related, and much higher in 
transaction value. The acquirers with complete data faced significantly more competitors 
for the same target firm and these acquirers are much bigger than the rest of the acquirers 
(acquirer common equity and sales). However, these acquirers were not performing 
significantly differently (ROE and market to book ratio). And the target firms in the 
complete sample are no different from the rest of the targets when it comes to size (target 
total assets, target common equity).  
Tables 16.1-16.4 compare the mean of variables in the target sample with all the 
deals occurred with public target firms headquartered in Canada or United States between 
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2009 to 2014 (5,717 M&As). Again, tables 16.1-16.4 have the same full sample (5,717 
deals) with different complete samples. Compared to the full sample, the target sample 
has a significantly higher proportion of hostile deal, tender offers, and merger of equal 
while the proportion of deals with toehold is lower. Also, there are more related deals in 
the target sample (both vertically and horizontally) than the full sample. Transaction 
value shows that the value of deals in the target sample is significantly larger. However, 
there is no significant difference when it comes to accounting performance (ROE and 
market-to-book ratio). Table 16.1-16.4 indicates that the target firms with complete data 
are significantly different from firms with missing data. Firms in the target sample are 
bigger and more related to the acquiring firm.  
4. 3. Results of the selection models 
Tables 17.1 and 17.2 report the results from the acquirer selection model. I report 
two sets of results: one with only acquirer ES extensiveness as the explanatory variable 
(tables 17.1); one with both ES extensiveness and standardization (tables 17.2). The 
reason to do so is due to the fact that the standardization variable is non-missing only 
when the firm has at least one of the modules in ES. Therefore, the coefficients of ES 
extensiveness and standardization in tables 17.2 can be interpreted as given that the 
acquiring firm has ES, what is the impact of ES on premium and acquirer short-term 
stock performance. The stage 1 result in table 17.2 shows that both acquirer ES 
extensiveness and standardization decrease the likelihood of a firm acquiring (model 1). 
Also, larger firms are more likely to become an acquirer. Given the firm is an acquirer in 
a given year, larger firms also are more likely to acquire a public target (model 2). 
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Models 3 and 5 show that the acquirer’s ES extensiveness is negatively related to the 
premium the acquirer is willing to pay for a target firm. When ES extensiveness increases 
1 SD (2.01), the premium paid decreases 13.5% (2.01*-6.713). However, both ES 
extensiveness and standardization are positively related to CAR (-63, 126), meaning the 
acquirer’s shareholders are reacting positively to the M&A deal. 
Tables 18.1-18.4 report the results of the target selection model. . Tables 18.1 and 
18.2 do not include ES standardization, while tables 18.3 and 18.4 have both ES 
extensiveness and standardization as explanatory variables. The stage 1 results indicate 
that both target ES extensiveness and standardization increase the likelihood of a firm 
being acquired (model 1 and 5 in table 18.3). Also, it is less likely for a larger firm to 
become a target (model 5 in table 18.3). The stage 2 results show the impact of ES on 
premium and market reaction towards the target after correcting for the selection bias. 
Tender offers have a positive effect on the premium and CAR (-2,2). Consistent with 
Officer (2003) and Schwert (2000), target size (although not significant), market-to-book 
ratio (models 10 and 11 in table 18.4), and toehold (model 4 and 7 in table 18.3) are 
negatively related to the premium and stock market reaction. Vertical relatedness has a 
negative impact on premium paid (9.3, 2-4) and positive impact on the market reaction 
(although not significant). The horizontal complementarity between the acquirer and 
target increases both the premium and market reaction.  
Both target ES extensiveness and standardization increase the premium received 
by the target firm and short-term stock return (table 18.3). The positive impact of ES 
extensiveness is even higher when the M&A deal is vertically related (4 of table 18.3). 
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This is consistent with hypothesis 3a and 3b. In model 2, when ES extensiveness 
increases one standard deviation (SD, which is 2.14), the premium received increases 
7.63% (which is approximately 15% of the average premium in the sample). When ES 
standardization increases one standard deviation (0.64), premium increases 10.8% 
(0.64*16.9). In model 6, when ES extensiveness and standardization increase 1 SD, the 
CAR (-2,2) increases 0.039 and 0.08 (2.14*0.0181 and 0.64*0.126).  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper seeks to contribute to the emerging debate on the value created by the 
significant investments by firms in information technologies that some estimates suggest 
account for over 50% of firms’ capital investments in the past decade.  In particular, we 
witness firms moving from customized software to supporting business processes and 
decision making by implementing Enterprise Systems that typically involve multi-year, 
multi-million dollar commitments for the transition.  While these complex projects are 
considerably disruptive to operations and often result in performance dips in the short and 
medium term (McAfee 1992), these projects have been justified based on the future 
benefits from coordinating and integrating business processes across enterprises; 
improving coordination and integration of resources across multiple functional and 
business units in the firm; the provision of real-time, accurate enterprise wide information 
for managers; as well as superior analytical tools and collaboration capabilities for 
decision making.  However, there have been few empirical studies of the value of the 
benefits from these complex systems.  We are also not aware of any a large scale 
empirical examinations of the relationship of superior resource coordination and 
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information provision capabilities provided by Enterprise Systems to the important 
managerial decisions regarding changes to the boundaries of the firm through mergers 
and acquisitions.  
The role that information technologies can play in regard to merger and 
acquisitions is currently under-appreciated, as suggested by observations that fewer than 
25% of firms involved the CIO in deliberations and decision processes for M&A 
initiatives (Yetton et. al 2013).  Our results that the extensiveness and standardization of 
ES within enterprises are significantly associated with both market value enhancement of 
the acquirer as well as high market valuation for the target highlights the important role 
information systems play in the creation as well as the deployment of firm resources and 
capabilities that deliver competitive advantages to firms.  
Our results have several important implications for research and for practice.  
First, for acquirers, the extensiveness as well as the degree of standardization of their 
enterprise system influences the level of unique potential synergies created for the 
acquirer that other contenders for targets are unlikely to be able to duplicate. Second, the 
availability of reliable and current information from multiple functional groups and 
business units that can be easily consolidated for decision making, and the availability of 
tools for financial modeling and simulations of different scenarios, enables senior 
executives to make informed and evidence based decisions in key aspects of M&A such 
as target choice and target firm valuation.  This enables the acquirers to accurately assess 
the unique synergy that can be realized in the acquisition, thus preventing the acquirer 
from overpaying for the acquisition.  
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This is re-assuring evidence to firms that the complex, multi-year projects to 
implement enterprise systems across the firm combined with architectural guidelines and 
governance policies to ensure that these systems are standardized and interoperable, can 
benefit the firm through the flexibility of resource acquisition and deployment (such as to 
enter new markets and geographies) to respond to changes in the industry and the 
economy. In particular, these actions provide competitive advantage in allowing firms to 
create value through M&A that is not available to competing firms without the foresight 
and managerial vision to incorporate ES extensiveness and ES standardization in the 
digital transformation of their business processes and IT capabilities.  
For target firms, that are often smaller, our results highlight that the value realized 
by shareholders when they are acquired are positively associated with enterprise system 
extensiveness and standardization. This is an interesting finding that, even for relatively 
smaller firms, it is important for them to invest in creating an information infrastructure 
across their business through enterprise systems and ensure that it is standardized.  An 
extensive and standardized enterprise system allows their resources and capabilities to be 
accurately valued by the market. The extensiveness and standardization of the enterprise 
information also assures a potential acquirer that the acquirer can easily integrate the 
target in their operations, increasing the market value of the target.  
In the selection model for the acquirer, the extensiveness and standardization of 
the acquirer is negatively related to acquisitions. This suggests that firms with extensive 
and standardized enterprise systems prefer to use information based coordination with 
partners, rather than acquiring them. However, if they do make an acquisition, they have 
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lower cost of integration compared to an average acquirer as they can “rip and replace” 
the information systems of the target with their own enterprise systems. This is one of the 
reasons that the market responds positively to acquisitions by such acquirers. However, in 
contrast to the acquirers, the targets with extensive and standardized enterprise systems 
are more likely to be acquired.  This may mean that even when acquirers expect to rip 
and replace the targets enterprise systems (if any), acquirers value the target having gone 
through the process of implementing an extensive and standardized enterprise system as 
such targets are better prepared to implement the acquirers enterprise systems. It is also 
possible that many acquirers are acquiring targets with extensive and standardized 
enterprise systems as they may replace their own systems with the extensive and 
standardized systems of the target firm.       
Further research can examine how the systems of the target firm change after an 
acquisition. Are the systems of the target “ripped and replaced” with the systems of the 
acquirer after an acquisition, or are they allowed to keep their existing systems. Also, is 
there any difference in this regard between targets with extensive and standardized 
enterprise systems and those without extensive and standardized information systems?   
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Conclusion 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the emerging debate on the value created by the 
significant investments by firms in information technologies that some estimates suggest 
account for over 30% of firms’ capital investments in the past decade (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2014). In particular, we witness firms moving from customized 
software to supporting business processes and decision making by implementing 
Enterprise Systems that typically involve multi-year, multi-million dollar commitments 
for the transition.  While these complex projects are disruptive to operations and often 
result in performance dips in the short and medium term (McAfee 1992), these projects 
have been justified based on the future benefits from coordinating and integrating 
business processes across enterprises; improving coordination and integration of 
resources across multiple functional and business units in the firm; the provision of real-
time, accurate enterprise wide information for managers; as well as superior analytical 
tools and collaboration capabilities for decision making.   
However, there is a lack of large-scale empirical studies of the value of the 
benefits from these complex systems. We are also not aware of any a large scale 
empirical examinations of the relationship of superior resource coordination and 
information provision capabilities provided by Enterprise Systems to the important 
managerial decisions regarding changes to the boundaries of the firm through mergers 
and acquisitions. Even in practice, the role that information technologies can play in 
regard to merger and acquisitions is currently under-appreciated, as suggested by 
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observations that fewer than 25% of firms involved the CIO in deliberations and decision 
processes for M&A initiatives (Yetton et. al 2013). 
Therefore, the results from this dissertation contribute theoretically and 
empirically to research in the IS field and also hold practical value. The first chapter of 
my dissertation reveals that ERP systems have a positive relationship with horizontal and 
conglomerate M&A as ERP systems can reduce internal coordination costs associated 
with operating a larger firm. The empirical analysis also indicates that this effect is 
stronger if the potential acquirer is larger. It also reveals that CRM (SCM) systems have a 
negative relationship with vertical M&A as CRM (SCM) systems can reduce the cost 
associated with coordinating with customers (suppliers), and thus CRM (SCM) systems 
allow firms to use information based coordination with customers (suppliers). The 
analysis also indicates that if the downstream industry is very unpredictable and dynamic 
that increases external coordination costs, then CRM systems facilitate ownership-based 
coordination by reducing the internal coordination cost associated with operating an 
integrated network of downstream partners. Similarly, if the supplier industry is 
concentrated i.e., suppliers have market power that increases external coordination costs, 
then SCM systems are associated with more vertical M&A as SCM systems can reduce 
the internal coordination cost of operating a more integrated supply chain network; thus 
enabling ownership-based coordination.   
The second chapter of the dissertation highlights that the value realized by 
shareholders when they are acquired are positively associated with enterprise system 
extensiveness and standardization of the target firm. This is an interesting finding that, 
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even for relatively smaller firms, it is important for them to invest in creating an 
information infrastructure across their business through enterprise systems and ensure 
that it is standardized. On the acquirer side, the extensiveness and standardization of 
enterprise systems are negatively related to acquisitions. This suggests that firms with 
extensive and standardized enterprise systems prefer to use information based 
coordination with partners, rather than acquiring them. However, if they do make an 
acquisition, they have lower cost of integration compared to an average acquirer as they 
can “rip and replace” the information systems of the target with their own enterprise 
systems. This is one of the reasons that the market responds positively to acquisitions by 
such acquirers. However, in contrast to the acquirers, the targets with extensive and 
standardized enterprise systems are more likely to be acquired.  This may mean that even 
when acquirers expect to rip and replace the targets enterprise systems (if any), acquirers 
value the target having gone through the process of implementing an extensive and 
standardized enterprise system as such targets are better prepared to implement the 
acquirers enterprise systems. It is also possible that many acquirers are acquiring targets 
with extensive and standardized enterprise systems as they may replace their own 
systems with the extensive and standardized systems of the target firm. 
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Table 4: Baseline Model: Negative Binomial Regression, 2009-2014 
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Table 6: First-stage OLS Results of Poisson Regression with Instrumental Variables 
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for the Target Sample 
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